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Changing board behaviour: The role of the ‘Two Strikes’ rule in improving the efficacy 
of Australian Say-on-Pay. 
James Borthwick, Aelee Jun, Shiguang Ma 
School of Accounting, Economics and Finance, 
Faculty of Business, University of Wollongong, NSW, Australia 
 
Abstract 
This paper analyses whether the transition from the 2004 CLERP 9 advisory Say-on-Pay 
regime to the ‘Two Strikes’ rule in 2012 influenced CEO pay in Australian firms. Analysing 
a panel of 2,074 firm-years (2005-2015), we find that: (i) CEO pay is a positive predictor of 
shareholder dissent; (ii) firm performance has a reducing effect on shareholder dissent (iii) 
excessive shareholder dissent moderated CEO pay under the ‘Two Strikes’ rule relative to the 
CLERP 9 regime and (iv) the market responded favourably to the introduction of the ‘Two 
Strikes’ rule and negatively to ‘strike’ instances after its introduction.  
Key words: Say on Pay; Two Strikes; Executive Compensation; Shareholder Dissent 






This research was supported by an Australian Government Research Training Program (RTP) Scholarship. We 
thank Terry Walter for his valuable suggestions provided on a recent draft. We are also grateful for the feedback 
provided by Henk Berkman, Robert Faff, and participants at the 2016 AFAANZ Conference and Doctoral 
Symposium. We acknowledge the anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments. James Borthwick can be 
contacted at jamesbor@uow.edu.au, Aelee Jun can be contacted at ajun@uow.edu.au, Shiguang Ma can be 




CEO pay growth across the developed world has remained at exceedingly high levels even 
after controlling for institutional differences in contract-setting environments. Murphy (2013) 
indicates that from 1983 to 1991, median total CEO pay in S&P 500 companies achieved an 
inflation-adjusted growth rate of approximately 4.3% per annum. From 1991 to 2001 growth 
averaged 15.7%; with the issuing of stock option grants to CEOs as the main contributor. For 
the period 2002 to 2011, the rate of growth in pay declined alongside a shift in remuneration 
design from stock options to restricted stock. In Australia, Shan and Walter (2016) indicate 
that between 2001 and 2012 CEO pay growth was markedly higher than inflation, with the 
Global Financial Crisis contributing to lower, but still positive growth after 2007.    
Academic debate and public perception remains divided in terms of the causes and the 
costs associated with the growth of executive pay as well as the effectiveness any additional 
reforms to corporate governance practice and regulation may have. Regardless, there is an 
expectation that additional mechanisms are put in place to increase the likelihood that senior 
executives in large corporations are remunerated based more closely on the performance of 
the firms they lead.  
 Shareholder voting on remuneration reports (hereafter referred to as ‘Say-on-
Pay’) has been introduced in many countries and enables shareholders to indicate to boards 
either their approval or disapproval of executive pay design at annual general meetings. 
Given that Say-on-Pay differs significantly between legislatures, we define a Say-on-Pay 
regime as having the following features: “(1) a recurring, mandatory, (2) binding or advisory 
shareholders’ vote, (3) provided by law, that (4) directly or indirectly through the approval of 
the remuneration system, remuneration report or remuneration policy, (5) governs the 
3 
individual or collective global remuneration package of the executives or managing directors 
of the corporation.” (Thomas and Van der Elst, 2015, p. 653). 
Advisory Say-on-Pay was first introduced as legislation in the United Kingdom in 
2002. Subsequently, advisory Say-on-Pay was introduced in Australia with the passage of the 
Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure) Act 
2004 (Cth) (Austl.) (‘CLERP 9’). Following the Global Financial Crisis, the Australian 
Government endorsed several corporate governance reform measures proposed in a 2009 
Productivity Commission report titled Review into the Regulation of Director and Executive 
Remuneration in Australia. The most significant of these reforms, and the one that is the 
focal point of this paper, was the change to shareholder voting legislation, widely referred to 
as the ‘Two Strikes’ rule. The ‘Two Strikes’ rule was introduced as part of the Corporations 
Amendment (Improving Accountability on Director and Executive Remuneration) Act 2011 
(Cth) (Austl.). Under this regime, shareholders vote on the remuneration report at the annual 
general meeting and if 25% of the votes are against the remuneration report, the firm receives 
a first ‘strike’. If a second ‘strike’ against the remuneration report is incurred in the following 
year for the same firm, this triggers a ‘spill resolution’. If the ‘spill resolution’ is then passed 
by a majority of votes, the board of directors excluding the CEO must face re-election at an 
extraordinary general meeting within 90 days after the annual general meeting. This measure 
represents a significant shift in comparison to the Say-on-Pay regime under CLERP 9, where 
shareholder voting on the remuneration report was advisory.  
 Given that Australia has transitioned away from the CLERP 9 regime to the ‘Two 
Strikes’ rule, this unique regulatory setting presents us with an opportunity to examine how a 
within-country transition to an arguably ‘stronger’ form of Say-on-Pay influenced executive 
pay design.  In particular, we consider whether the ‘Two Strikes’ rule implemented in 2012 
was more successful in moderating CEO pay relative to the CLERP 9 advisory voting regime 
4 
introduced in 2004. We believe this type of two-regime comparison within a single country 
has yet to be conducted in the existing literature and makes an important contribution to our 
understanding of Say-on-Pay. Furthermore, this study expects to minimise the potential for 
the results to be influenced by confounding institutional and country-specific factors which 
might be present if we were to study either different regimes in a multi-country study or a 
single regime where no other Say-on-Pay regime had been previously implemented. 
 For our analysis we consider a sample of ASX 300 firms from 2005 to 2015 (2,074 
firm-years). The sample includes shareholder dissent and CEO remuneration characteristics 
as well as vectors of financial, CEO-specific and corporate governance variables.
1
 Ordinary 
least-squares and quantile regression techniques are employed to examine the determinants of 
shareholder dissent, as well as the degree to which CEO pay was moderated by shareholder 
voting behaviour.
2
  In addition, event studies are conducted to measure market reactions to 
the introduction of the ‘Two Strikes’ rule and first and second ‘strike’ instances after 2012. 
Our findings suggest that CEO pay is a positive and statistically significant 
determinant of shareholder dissent for the entire sample period. Surprisingly, this relation is 
not as apparent post-2012. This lack of association may indicate that the ‘Two Strikes’ rule 
had a disciplining effect on shareholder voting behaviour. Given the significant costs to the 
board (and the firm as a whole) of consistently high dissent levels under the ‘Two Strikes’ 
rule, shareholders may have behaved more prudently in their allocation of negative votes 
after 2012. Furthermore, the results may also suggest that the ‘Two Strikes’ rule could have 
had a legitimising effect on shareholder perceptions of ‘high’ CEO pay levels regardless of 
the degree to which pay departed from acceptable levels.  
                                                          
1
  Refer to Appendix 1 for a full listing of variables used in regression analysis. 
2
 Quantile regression is included as an empirical method for the purposes of developing a more flexible and 
detailed understanding of the relationship between CEO pay and shareholder dissent across the sample 
distribution. 
5 
This study contributes to the literature in at least two important ways. It is the first to 
our knowledge that analyses the impact of a Say-on-Pay regime transition within a single 
institutional context. In particular, the ‘Two Strikes’ rule is unique insofar as it empowers 
minority shareholders with a 25% negative vote requirement for a ‘strike’. This low threshold 
for dissent and the fact that the regulation only becomes ‘binding’ on the firms board after a 
series of steps including two consecutive ‘strikes’ and the passing of a ‘spill resolution’ 
(requiring a 50% threshold to pass), makes it unique amongst other Say-on-Pay regimes 
around the world. This study therefore provides a bridge between the CLERP 9 analysis of 
Clarkson et al. (2011) and studies of the ‘Two Strikes’ rule by Monem and Ng (2013), 
Bugeja et al. (2017) and Grosse et al. (2017). Additionally and unique to the Australian 
literature, we consider market reactions to the passage of the ‘Two Strikes’ rule, from its 
conception to its final implementation. This aligns our study with similar studies which 
measure investor perceptions of the introduction of Say-on-Pay in other contexts. The 
findings from this paper therefore provide some insights to policymakers in terms of the 
benefits and costs associated with modifying extant advisory Say-on-Pay regimes to further 
strengthen the voting power of minority shareholders. 
Furthermore, our sample includes only large listed-firms that are members of the ASX 
300 index. The benefits of focusing exclusively on large firms are twofold. Firstly, it 
facilitates the generalisability of the results to other institutional contexts with larger mean 
firm sizes including the US and UK. Secondly, the ASX 300 index comprises approximately 
81% of Australian equity market capitalisation, thereby accounting for the majority of 
influential firms in the marketplace. In addition, the results indicate that following the 
introduction of the ‘Two Strikes’ rule, shareholder dissent in previous periods moderated 
executive pay relative to the CLERP 9 regime. What is particularly interesting is that there is 
only a negative and statistically significant association between dissent and CEO pay when 
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shareholder dissent either resulted in a first ‘strike’ or was greater than the sample mean 
level. This finding may be an indication that, given the stringent regulatory environment post-
2012, boards were more responsive to reforming CEO pay design based on shareholder 
dissent.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a background 
on agency theoretic interpretations of executive pay and findings in the empirical literature. 
Based on the literature and theory, hypotheses are developed in Section 3. Section 4 outlines 
the sample selection and methodology, and our results are provided in Section 5. We 
conclude with Section 6 and discuss the implications of the study as well as its limitations. 
 
2.  Background 
2.1 Optimal contracting and managerial power 
Optimal contracting is based on the notion that managers and boards negotiate remuneration 
contracts at an arms-length, and executive remuneration is set at a level which incentivises 
CEOs to behave in a way that maximises shareholder wealth (Hölmstrom, 1979; Murphy, 
1999). The establishment of efficient contracts however is subject to internal and external 
constraints.
3
 Government regulation serves as one form of external constraint. Opponents to 
additional corporate governance regulation suggest that it reduces board decision-autonomy, 
increases compliance costs and decreases the speed at which boards are able to adjust to 
changes in their business environments. Bainbridge (2008) and Mangen and Magnan (2011) 
voice this concern with respect to greater shareholder influence in board decision-making. 
They argue that shareholder voting is likely to increase governance costs, with limited or no 
                                                          
3
 From an internal perspective, asymmetric information reduces the ability of the board to monitor executive 
behaviour. With executives holding more knowledge regarding the true nature of business dealings, the 
executive may be incentivised to behave in a way that maximises their own personal utility. A primary external 
constraint on the contract setting is the ‘market for executives’ (Rosen, 1992). 
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real impact on executive pay levels. Optimal contracting stresses that it is not the general 
magnitude of executive pay that is the real concern, but the relationship between CEO pay 
and firm performance (Jensen and Murphy, 1990). In this context, increased regulation over 
corporate governance could potentially inhibit the creation of efficient contracts. The addition 
of shareholder voting rights on executive pay can also be seen as problematic when taking 
into account the characteristics of the modern shareholder. With modern shareholders as 
liquid and amorphous collectives, there are important informational and organisational 
limitations placed on their effectiveness as monitors of management.
4
 The inclusion of the 
shareholder ‘collective’ in voting on executive pay essentially shifts the balance of decision-
making power in a firm from director primacy to board-shareholder consensus (Arrow, 1974; 
Hölmstrom, 2005; Bainbridge, 2008; Armstrong et al., 2013).   
In contrast, the managerial power approach,
5
 developed by Lucian Bebchuk in 
collaboration with other authors, questions the credibility of arms-length monitoring and 
negotiating between CEOs and boards.
6
 Managerial power theorists posit that powerful CEOs 
are able to extract sub-optimal rents in the contracting process due to their ability to exert 
influence over boards through various structural and psycho-social channels (Bebchuk and 
Fried, 2004). The primary tenets of the managerial power approach include; rent-seeking, the 
outrage constraint
7
 and the incentive to camouflage
8
 rent-seeking behaviour. These 
components attempt to describe the dynamics of executive and board interactions in the pay-
setting process (see also Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001, and Bebchuk and Fried, 2003). 
                                                          
4
 Informational issues relate to the opportunity costs to a shareholder of becoming informed. This is important in 
large firms where single shareholder votes may be so insignificant so as to not influence the voting outcome. 
Organisational limitations include free-riding and the lack of centralised leadership in a shareholder group. 
5
 Otherwise referred to as rent extraction or board capture theory. 
6
 See also Bebchuk and Fried, 2003; Bebchuk and Cohen, 2005; Bebchuk et al., 2011. 
7 The outrage constraint is the theoretical upper threshold for executive pay, where remuneration levels above 
the constraint increases the likelihood for shareholder activism and negative media attention. This notion is of 
particular importance in the study of shareholder voting (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003). 
8
 Camouflage strategies are defined by Bebchuk and Fried (2003) as measures used by executives to reduce the 
likelihood of firm outsiders from recognising rent seeking behaviour. 
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With this in mind, the managerial power approach advocates for greater shareholder rights in 
corporate governance, above and beyond those provided under Say-on-Pay regimes already 
in place in the US, UK and other countries (Bebchuk, 2005).
9
  From a managerial power 
perspective, Say-on-Pay regimes, and especially binding regimes, could be seen as one of 
several other partial solutions to the pervasive problems facing modern corporate governance. 
 
2.2 Empirical evidence: the United Kingdom and United States 
UK Say-on-Pay studies have focused on market reactions to the introduction of Say-on-Pay 
legislation, the determinants of shareholder dissent, board responsiveness to high levels of 
shareholder dissent, the influence of voting outcomes on the pay-performance relationship 
and CEO pay growth. Ferri and Maber (2013) analyse market reactions to the passage of Say-
on-Pay in the UK and find that investors reacted positively to its introduction. Carter and 
Zamora (2009), Conyon and Sadler (2010) and Gregory-Smith et al. (2014) find that high 
CEO remuneration is a key determinant of shareholder dissent.  In addition, Alissa (2015) 
finds that dissent is higher in firms with poor performance. With respect to board 
responsiveness to high dissent, Alissa (2015) and Carter and Zamora (2009) observe that 
boards respond selectively to negative Say-on-Pay. In particular, Carter and Zamora (2009) 
find that boards are selective in how they respond to negative voting results when there is a 
weak relationship between CEO bonus and firm performance. Regarding the pay-
performance relationship, Ferri and Maber (2013) observe a strengthening of the pay-
performance relation after the implementation of Say-on-Pay in the UK. This is in contrast 
with the earlier finding by Thompson (2005), which suggested minimal change as a result of 
the new regulation. Further, Ferri and Maber (2013) find that this strengthening of the pay-
performance relation did not reduce CEO pay growth in the UK. In contrast, Gregory-Smith 
                                                          
9
 Reform recommendations proposed by Bebchuk (2005) centre on providing shareholders with the right to both 
initiate and vote on key business arrangements. 
9 
et al. (2014) indicate that in high-dissent firms, where shareholder dissent is above 10%, 
dissent does moderate CEO pay in future periods. 
Prior to the introduction of the Dodd-Frank Act 2010, a number of studies considered 
the role that shareholder activism, in general, played in corporate governance.
10
 Since then, 
studies of US Say-on-Pay have considered market reactions to the introduction of the Dodd-
Frank Act 2010, the determinants of shareholder dissent, the influence of dissent on the pay-
performance relation and CEO pay growth. Cai and Walkling (2011) measure market 
reactions to a series of events on and around the announcement of the Dodd-Frank Act 2010. 
Their results suggest that poorly performing firms with weak pay-performance sensitivity 
reacted positively to announcements. They caution, however, that in the presence of 
misplaced shareholder activism, Say-on-Pay may unjustly punish firms based solely on their 
size.  Zhang et al. (2014) find shareholder dissent to be decreasing in the quality of pay 
disclosure and increasing in total and abnormal CEO pay. Iliev and Vitanova (2015) indicate 
that firms compliant to the new Say-on-Pay regime simultaneously increased both total 
remuneration and the sensitivity of the pay-performance relationship. They therefore 
conclude that the Say-on-Pay regime had a minimal impact in actually curbing the growth of 
executive pay in the US. Conversely, Kimbro and Xu (2016) find support for the notion that 
Say-on-Pay can indeed moderate the growth of CEO pay in future periods. The curbing of 
pay is found to be strongest when shareholder dissent is high in poorly performing firms and 
where shareholders strongly reject a remuneration report. In an interesting study, Balsam et 
al. (2016) find that firms pre-emptively reduced CEO pay levels prior to the introduction of 
the legislation in 2010 and introduced additional performance-based pay in their contract 
design as a result.   
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 For further details on shareholder activism prior to the introduction of the Dodd-Frank Act (2010) in the US 
refer to Thomas and Martin (1999), Ertimur et al. (2010) and Ertimur et al. (2011). 
10 
Outside of the UK, US and Australia, Say-on-Pay has been implemented in other 
countries, including but not limited to, the Netherlands in 2004, Sweden in 2005, Germany in 
2009, Belgium in 2010, and France and Switzerland in 2013. Making comparisons between 





whether the results are binding or non-binding. Nevertheless, Correa and Lel (2016) analyse 
Say-on-Pay in a sample of firms in 38 countries. By employing a difference-in-differences 
fixed effects design they find that Say-on-Pay increased the sensitivity of the pay-
performance relationship and observe a decline in the growth rate of CEO pay in countries 
where Say-on-Pay legislation is present.  Consistent with the non-uniformity of the extant 
literature, studies of Australian Say-on-Pay has also produced mixed results. 
 
2.3 Australian Say-on-Pay: empirical evidence 
In Australia, the introduction of the ‘Two Strikes’ rule was primarily driven by a high 
proportion of negative advisory votes against the remuneration reports of large firms in the 
lead up and during the Global Financial Crisis. For example, during the 2009 Annual General 
Meeting period (October to December 2009), under the advisory regime, 30 of the 157 ASX 
200 firms received dissenting votes of 25% or more from their shareholder base (‘Prudence 
holds Sway on Pay’, 2010). Given this backdrop, the ‘Two Strikes’ regime was proposed by 
the Productivity Commission in November 2009, and later formally endorsed (amongst other 
recommendations) by the Australian Government in April 2010. Following a formal 
legislative process, the Corporations Amendment (Improving Accountability on Director and 
Executive Remuneration) Act 2011 (Cth) (Austl.) was introduced; with the Act coming into 
effect at the commencement of the 2012 fiscal year.  
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 Two-tier boards are prevalent in Germany, the Netherlands and France. 
12
 In the Netherlands, voting on remuneration only occurs when the board proposes a change in remuneration 
policy, and in the US, non-binding votes must be taken every three years at a minimum (Thomas and Van der 
Elst, 2015). 
11 
 Prior to the ‘Two Strikes’ rule, Byrnes and Chapple (2009) and Clarkson et al. (2011) 
examine the impact of advisory voting under CLERP 9. Byrnes and Chapple (2009) find that 
boards in high dissent firms (i.e., the proportion of ‘no’ to total votes was greater than 10%), 
were motivated to make significant changes to CEO pay design. Clarkson et al. (2011) find a 
relative strengthening of the pay-performance relationship as a result of the CLERP 9 
legislation. 
In their analysis of the ‘Two Strikes’ rule, Monem and Ng (2013) find that the pay-
performance relation improved in firms who received a first ‘strike’ on their remuneration 
report, but who then avoided a second ‘strike’ in the subsequent year. Furthermore, they 
suggest that shareholders in first ‘strike’ firms may have been “over-enthusiastic” when first 
provided with their voting rights. Bugeja et al. (2017) conclude that ‘strike’ incidents 
moderate CEO pay in future periods and result in changes to the composition of CEO pay. In 
addition, CEO turnover increases as a result of high shareholder dissent, however, directors 
do not seem to bear equivalent costs in terms of their tenure as directors in other firms. 
Grosse et al. (2017) study 248 rejections of remuneration reports between 2011 and 2012, 
and find no association between any constituent of executive pay and the likelihood of a firm 
receiving a ‘strike’. They conclude that it is not pay design per-se which dictates negative 
Say-on-Pay results, but poor firm performance. Kent et al. (2016) consider the role that 
shareholder dissent plays in the adoption of ASX recommendations of good corporate 
governance. They find that dissent is lower in firms with remuneration committees that are at 
least partially independent and are sufficiently large (three or more members).   
Given that Australia has transitioned away from the CLERP 9 advisory regime to the 
‘Two Strikes’ rule, an important policy question to address is whether this change further 
moderated executive pay. In addition, given that both the UK and US persist with 
maintaining ‘advisory’ Say-on-Pay regimes, there is a pertinent need to understand how 
12 
further empowerment of minority shareholders, as is the case with the ‘Two Strikes’ rule, 
might influence Say-on-Pay in these contexts. Addressing these two questions empirically is 
the primary motivation of this paper. 
 
3. Hypothesis development 
3.1 The determination of shareholder dissent 
Say-on-Pay regimes are designed to provide a legislative mechanism through which 
shareholders are able to express their views on executive pay. Thus, it can be assumed that 
CEO pay will be a positive and statistically significant determinant of shareholder dissent. In 
this paper, CEO remuneration is defined as the natural logarithm of total remuneration, 
inclusive of salary, bonus, options and share issuances. A significant proportion of studies in 
the literature find that CEO pay is positively correlated with shareholder dissent (Thomas and 
Martin, 1999; Conyon and Sadler, 2010; Gregory-Smith et al., 2014). Conyon and Sadler 
(2010), in their study of the UK context, find that shareholder dissent is increasing in excess 
CEO pay. Further, they compare different types of shareholder proposals and find that 
shareholders are more likely to vote negatively towards remuneration proposals. Similarly, 
Gregory-Smith et al. (2014) in their analysis of UK Say-on-Pay before and after the Global 
Financial Crisis, find a positive correlation between CEO pay and shareholder dissent. 
Therefore, it is expected that shareholder dissent is increasing in CEO pay and that this 
relationship is strengthened with the adoption of the ‘Two Strikes’ rule. Based on key results 
in the empirical literature the following hypotheses are made: 
𝐻1: CEO Pay is a positive and statistically significant determinant of shareholder dissent 
under both the CLERP 9 and ‘Two Strikes’ rule shareholder voting regimes.  
13 
𝐻2: The positive effect of CEO pay on shareholder dissent is an order of magnitude higher 
when firms are subject to the ‘Two Strikes’ rule relative to the CLERP 9 shareholder voting 
regime. 
 
 The primary purpose of Say-on-Pay is to provide an outlet for shareholders to indicate 
to the board, either their acceptance or rejection of executive pay design. However, findings 
in the literature suggest that shareholders may deviate from this objective and deploy their 
votes to punish poorly performing firms. Thomas and Martin (1999) find that firms exhibiting 
poor performance and high CEO remuneration are often targets of shareholder activism. Cai 
and Walkling (2011), who study the market reaction to the introduction of US Say-on-Pay, 
conclude that firms with poor performance reacted positively to announcements. 
Furthermore, Grosse et al. (2017), although they find no correlation between dissent and 
executive pay, highlight that firm performance indicators are key determinants of shareholder 
dissent. In order to analyse this expected relationship, this study employs industry-adjusted 
total shareholder return as a proxy for firm performance, measured as the inflation and 
industry return-adjusted annual holding period return using adjusted closing prices (Industry-
adjusted Mean TSR).
13
 Given the evidence in the literature, it is hypothesised that: 
𝐻3: Firm performance is a negative and statistically significant determinant of shareholder 
dissent, with this association persisting under both the CLERP 9 and the ‘Two Strikes’ Say-
on-Pay regimes. 
  
3.2 The determination of CEO pay 
The role of shareholder dissent in moderating future CEO pay design is a core focus of this 
paper. Byrnes and Chapple (2009) indicate that in instances where shareholder dissent, 
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 We thank Professor Terry Walter for his suggestions on the use of industry-adjusted returns as a measure of 
firm performance. 
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measured as ‘no’ votes as a proportion of total votes, was greater than 10%, boards acted to 
reform CEO pay structure and performance incentives in future periods. Ertimur et al. (2010) 
find that shareholder activism is more effective in influencing board decision-making relative 
to conventional measures of good corporate governance. Furthermore, Gregory-Smith et al. 
(2014) and Kimbro and Xu (2016) present evidence to suggest that shareholder dissent 
moderates future executive pay in instances where shareholder dissent is excessive. As a 
result, the following hypothesis is made: 
𝐻4: Shareholder dissent in the previous financial year had a negative and statistically 
significant influence on CEO pay levels and that this correlation is strongest in instances 
where dissent is excessive.
14
  
 Given the negative ramifications on boards for sustained shareholder dissent under the 
‘Two Strikes’ rule when compared to the advisory regime instituted as part of the CLERP 9 
legislation, an additional hypothesis is made regarding the relationship between shareholder 
dissent and CEO pay: 
𝐻5: Boards were more likely to constrain CEO pay when faced with excessive levels of 
shareholder dissent under the ‘Two Strikes’ rule relative to the CLERP 9 shareholder voting 
regime. 
 
3.3 Market reactions to the ‘Two Strikes’ rule 
3.3.1 The ‘Two Strikes’ rule implementation 
Larcker et al. (2011) and Hitz and Müller-Bloch (2015) in their studies of US and German 
Say-on-Pay respectively, find negative market reactions to the introduction of Say-on-Pay. 
Their results support the notion that the market perceived additional regulation of executive 
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 In our main regression analysis, ‘excessive’ shareholder dissent is defined as dissent levels above the mean 
level observed in the panel. 
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pay as a constraint on the contracting process. In contrast, Ferri and Maber (2013) measure 
market reactions to the passage of advisory Say-on-Pay in the UK and find that shareholders 
generally perceived Say-on-Pay as value-increasing. In the US, Cai and Walkling (2011) find 
that investors reacted positively to the introduction of advisory Say-on-Pay, with the 
magnitude of positive reactions being highest for firms with poor governance characteristics. 
Consistent with Cai and Walkling (2011) and Ferri and Maber (2013) our study considers 
market reactions to the introduction of Say-on-Pay legislation. We consider market reactions 
to events leading up to and including the introduction of the ‘Two Strikes’ rule in Australia, 
and hypothesise that: 
𝐻6: The market responded positively to events leading up to and including the introduction of 
the ‘Two Strikes’ rule. 
 
3.3.2 First and second ‘strikes’ on the remuneration report 
In addition to an analysis of market reactions to the implementation of the ‘Two Strikes’ rule 
we consider investor reactions to first and second ‘strikes’. Bugeja et al. (2017) produce a 
similar analysis where they consider market reactions to high dissent (strikes) after the 
introduction of the ‘Two Strikes’ rule and observe negative reactions to ‘strike’ instances 
overall. We differentiate our analysis from Bugeja et al. (2017) by comparing market 
reactions to high shareholder dissent in both the pre-regulation (‘CLERP 9’) and post-
regulation (‘Two Strikes’) periods. For the purposes of comparability with ‘strikes’ in the 
post-regulation period, we regard instances of ‘high’ dissent in the pre-regulation period as 
instances where voting is greater than or equal to 25% at the firm-level. With respect to 
market reactions to first and second ‘strikes’, we hypothesise that: 
𝐻7: The market responded negatively to high levels of shareholder dissent and this negative 
reaction is strongest after the introduction of the ‘Two Strikes’ rule. 
16 
 
4.  Methodology and data collection 
4.1 The sample 
Our sample is an unbalanced panel covering 2005 to 2015 fiscal years for Australian listed 
firms in the ASX 300.
15
 The sample period selected is an important feature of this study, as it 
spans the introduction of CLERP 9,
16
 the improved remuneration disclosure requirements for 
listed firms in 2005 and 2009 (AASB, 1046; AASB, 124), the Global Financial Crisis and 
post-crisis changes to corporate governance regulation. The main addition to corporate 
governance regulation after the Global Financial Crisis was the introduction of the ‘Two 
Strikes’ rule at the commencement of the 2012 fiscal year.
17
  
Variables for the analysis were both hand-collected as well as retrieved from the 
Thomson Reuters Connect4, Morningstar DatAnalysis, Bloomberg LP and Bureau van Dijk 
OSIRIS databases. The Thomson Reuters Connect4 database provided CEO remuneration and 
corporate governance data for Australian-listed firms. Annual report data for the firms in the 
sample was collected from the Morningstar DatAnalysis database. Bureau van Dijk OSIRIS 
provided data on investor concentration and shareholder returns data used to calculate 
industry-adjusted annual firm stock returns was collected from the Bloomberg LP database. 
Pre-2012 advisory shareholder voting data was hand-collected from mandatory annual 
general meeting disclosures in Morningstar DatAnalysis and the Bloomberg LP database 
provided the shareholder voting data from 2012 onwards. The final sample consists of 2,074 
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ASX 300 is a float –adjusted market capitalisation index of 300 largest companies listed in Australia from 
Standard & Poor’s and comprises approximately 81% of Australian equity market capitalisation. 
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 CLERP 9 introduced advisory voting on the remuneration report amongst other measures including, increased 
powers provided to ASIC for breaches of continuous disclosure requirements, heightened financial reporting 
and auditing requirements, financial services licencing as well as changes to fundraising provisions. 
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 The ASX Listing rule 12.8 was also introduced at the commencement of the 2012 financial year and required 
ASX 300 firms to have remuneration committees which were wholly composed of non-executive directors. The 
regression models included in this paper account for this by incorporating a remuneration committee 
independence variable (Remuneration Committee Inside/Outside Ratio) as a constituent of the vector of 
corporate governance indicators. 
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firm-years for the 11 year period under analysis. Appendix 1 provides a list and detailed 
description of variables used in this study. 
In instances where the CEO was in their last year of tenure with the firm they were 
excluded from the final data set. This is because the inclusion of termination payments in 
total pay would have biased remuneration levels upwards.
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 If the CEO was only at the helm 
for a proportion of a whole financial year they were also excluded so as not to bias 
remuneration values downward. Furthermore, the sample was adjusted to account for the 
availability of shareholder voting data in both the Bloomberg LP and Morningstar 
DatAnalysis databases. Bloomberg LP provided voting data for ASX 300 firms after the 
implementation of the ‘Two Strikes’ rule. Voting data for the advisory period (2005-2011) 
was then hand-collected using the Morningstar DatAnalysis database. To ensure that ‘real’ 
value changes are captured in the analysis, financial and compensation data is deflated to 
2005 dollars and exchange rate adjusted in instances where executives were remunerated in a 
currency other than Australian dollars. Inflation and exchange rate data was sourced from the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics.  
This study considers the shareholder voting behaviour for large firms only and as a 
result diverges somewhat from the studies completed by Clarkson et al. (2011), Monem and 
Ng (2013) and Bugeja et al. (2017). Monem and Ng (2013) consider first and second ‘strikes’ 
on remuneration reports to measure their impact on executive pay and the pay-performance 
relationship. They find that the likelihood of receiving a ‘no’ vote on a remuneration report of 
25% or more decreases with size due to smaller firms tending to have relatively weaker 
governance structures. Bugeja et al. (2017) find that first ‘strike’ firms tend to be relatively 
larger in size whilst second ‘strike’ firms tend to be smaller than first ‘strike’ firms. Clarkson 
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 Termination payments, despite being made at the conclusion of employment should theoretically be amortised 
over the entire employment horizon of the CEO. Thus, by excluding final year payments, this decreases the 
likelihood of misrepresenting remuneration figures for individual executives (Merhebi et al., 2006; Bushman et 
al., 2010; Duong and Evans, 2015). 
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et al. (2011) consider a sample of Australian-listed firms of various sizes for the period 2000 
to 2009, with 240 firms identified as having complete data for the full sample period.  
With the ASX 300 capturing approximately 81% of equity market capitalisation in 
Australia, the sample employed in this study considers a significant proportion of the impact 
of Say-on-Pay on the Australian corporate landscape. Furthermore, CEO pay growth in 
Australia prior to the implementation of the ‘Two Strikes’ rule was concentrated in the largest 
Australian-listed firms and gives further impetus to this sample selection. According to the 
Productivity Commission (2009), in the lead up to the financial crisis, CEO remuneration in 
the top 100 companies grew at approximately 13% per year in real terms from 1990 to 2000, 
with growth slowing to 6% per annum to 2007. Further, in the 2008 financial year, average 
remuneration for the top 20 CEOs was $7.2M when compared to $0.26M for the smallest 
firms. Given that the recommendations made by the Productivity Commission of a ‘Two 
Strikes’ shareholder voting regime was predicated on the notion that excessive executive pay 
was one of the main contributors to the Global Financial Crisis, it is imperative to measure 
the impact of the ‘Two Strikes’ rule on the largest Australian-listed firms. In addition, and 
importantly, ASX 300 firms from the commencement of the 2012 financial year are subject 
to ASX Listing Rule 12.8 while smaller firms are not. Therefore, selecting a sample of only 
ASX 300 firms also captures the effect of mandated remuneration committee structure. In 
doing so, it more closely ensures homogeneity with respect to the corporate governance 
regulations that the constituents of the sample are subject to; reducing the likelihood of bias 
in the estimation of relationships.  
 
4.2 Research method 
In order to address hypothesis 1 to 5 of this paper, we consider a series of regressions to 
establish the relation between shareholder dissent and firm-specific variables. The particular 
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approach used is consistent with the work of Gregory-Smith et al. (2014) in two ways. 
Firstly, Gregory-Smith et al. (2014) consider the impact of the Global Financial Crisis on 
shareholder dissent in the UK by double-interacting a 2008 year dummy with independent 
variables. In this way, they measure the effect of the crisis on shareholder dissent levels. 
Similarly, this paper considers a policy-change dummy at the commencement of the 2012 
financial year; gauging the impact of the ‘Two Strikes’ rule on shareholder dissent levels. 
The impact of the Global Financial Crisis on shareholder dissent is also captured in this study 
through the inclusion of year effects. Secondly, Gregory-Smith et al. (2014) employ 
multivariate quantile regression analysis with and without linear splines, thereby facilitating 
the interpretability of baseline regression results. Fitting a linear spline at the sample mean 
level of dissent, provides an indication of how boards respond to negative voting when 
dissent levels are either above or below the sample mean.  
This paper employs the use of median quantile regressions in addition to mean 
regression analysis to develop an understanding of the relationship between shareholder 
dissent and CEO pay. Conventional regression models including ordinary least-squares and 
fixed effects focus on the central tendency of the distribution. Quantile regression provides an 
opportunity to analyse how relationships differ across the distribution of both shareholder 
dissent and CEO pay. This particular regression approach elucidates additional information 
from the analysis and allows the measurement of any threshold effects, as well as providing 
the opportunity to examine the uniformity of relationships across quantiles. In this study 











In terms of research design, this paper diverges significantly from the work of Monem 
and Ng (2013) and Clarkson et al. (2011) in that the pay-performance relationship is not 
directly addressed. Nor is there a central focus on measuring the impacts of ‘strikes’ on firms, 
as is the case in Monem and Ng (2013), Bugeja et al. (2017) and Grosse et al. (2017). Instead 
20 
we consider shareholder dissent under both pre and post-2012 regimes and investigate the 
influence of enhanced shareholder voting rights on financial, governance and CEO 
attributes.
19
   
 In order to test hypothesis 6 and 7 we conduct event studies to analyse market 
reactions to both the introduction of the ‘Two Strikes’ rule and instances of firm-level first 
and second ‘strikes’ against remuneration reports. We utilise the market model and the daily 
adjusted-closing prices from firms in our panel to measure the significance of cumulative 
average abnormal returns (CAARs) to identified events.  
 
5.  Empirical analysis 
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 provides detailed descriptive statistics of shareholder dissent, CEO pay and control 
variables. Panel A indicates that shareholder dissent for the entire sample period is 8.22%, 
with a median of 3.44%. This skewness in the distribution of shareholder voting is consistent 
across all years in the sample, and indicates that the majority of shareholder voting outcomes 
are concentrated at the lower levels of dissent. Further, from 2008 onwards, mean dissent 
levels fluctuate between 7% and 11%; consistent with both the Australian and UK Say-on-
Pay literature. In the Australian context, Clarkson et al. (2011) report mean dissent levels for 
the period 2005 to 2009 of between 5% and 12% with median annual dissent levels 
significantly lower than their associated means. Similarly, splitting their sample summary 
statistics into ‘strike’ and ‘control’ samples, Monem and Ng (2013) indicate that their ‘non-
strike’ sample-subset averaged dissent below 5% for both 2011 and 2012 financial years. 
‘Strike’ firms, where dissent levels are already greater than a 25% level of dissent, had an 
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 Results presented in Table 9 present propensity score matched results of the impact of ‘strikes’ on CEO pay 
and are consistent with findings in the main analysis. 
21 
average dissent level of 45%.
20
 To illustrate these findings, Figure 1 provides a visual 
representation of the extent to which shareholder dissent deviated throughout the sample 
period. Initial indications of a shift in voting behaviour caused by regulatory change are 
limited when viewing the year-on-year changes in voting behaviour. 
< INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE > 
< INSERT TABLE 1 HERE > 
Panel B presents descriptive statistics on CEO pay for all years in the sample. Mean 
and median total remuneration fluctuates to a substantially greater extent when compared to 
changes in shareholder voting behaviour. Total remuneration grew from an average of 
$1.53M in 2005 to $2.19M in 2011. Following the introduction of the ‘Two Strikes’ rule in 
2012, total mean remuneration peaked at $2.31M with pay growth stagnating for the period 
2013 to 2015. Equity remuneration increased substantially to $0.72M in 2012 and then 
declined to almost pre-regulation levels with average equity remuneration equal to $0.57M in 
2015. Non-equity remuneration in the sample fluctuated less than equity remuneration as a 
proportion of total pay. Consistent with other Australian studies, non-equity remuneration 
constituted the majority of CEO pay for all years in the sample. Matolcsy and Wright (2007) 
and Bugeja et al. (2012) highlight that the primary reason for this relates to the tax treatment 
of equity remuneration in Australia, when compared to the US and UK systems. In the 
Australian context, salary and bonus payments are considered tax-deductible whereas option 
issuances are not. In comparison, the taxation systems in the US and UK, are favourable 
towards the use of equity payments as incentivising forms of remuneration for employees. 
Furthermore, the Australian government, following the Global Financial Crisis, introduced 
additional tax measures to discourage firms from engaging in equity-based remuneration 
schemes.  
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 Our study utilises the same metric for shareholder dissent as both Clarkson et al. (2011) and Monem and Ng 
(2013) to facilitate comparability with the Australian literature. Monem and Ng (2013) include shareholder 
dissent as a continuous variable to supplement their analysis of the impact of ‘strikes’ on CEO pay levels. 
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Lastly, Panel C provides summary statistics of all other firm-specific, CEO-specific 
and corporate governance control variables incorporated in the regression analysis. The 
results obtained are consistent with other contemporary empirical studies of corporate 
governance in Australia (see also Matolcsy and Wright, 2007; Clarkson et al., 2011; 
Matolcsy and Wright, 2011; Monem, 2013; Monem and Ng, 2013; Duong and Evans, 2015).  
 
5.2 Univariate analysis 
To supplement the regression analysis, tests of mean and median differences for all variables, 
including analyses of how shareholder dissent and CEO remuneration varied across industries 
before and after the implementation of the ‘Two Strikes’ rule are provided in Table 2. Table 2 
Panel A indicates that overall shareholder dissent did not deviate significantly from a mean 
dissent level of approximately 8% between the two regulatory periods. Further, the analysis 
in Table 2 Panel B indicates that the only statistically significant fluctuations in shareholder 
dissent were in the Industrials and Health Care industries, with dissent levels in Industrials 
declining from a mean value of 10.67% to 7.25% and dissent increasing in the Health Care 
industry from 6.37% to 9.41%. Despite mean voting behaviour not changing significantly 
between the two periods, mean total remuneration in Table 2 Panel A did increase 
substantially between pre and post regulatory periods from $1.85M to $2.05M. When 
considering industry-level tests of difference in Table 2 Panel C, mean remuneration growth 
was highest in the Industrials ($1.47M to $1.92M) and Health Care ($1.26M to 2.02M) 
industries. This is an interesting result, especially with respect to Industrials, as total 
remuneration increased alongside an overall decline in shareholder dissent levels.  
< INSERT TABLE 2 > 
Importantly, when considering the non-equity and equity components of executive 
remuneration, there is evidence to suggest that increases in equity remuneration were the 
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main contributor to growth in total remuneration in the post-2012 period. According to Table 
2 Panel A, mean equity remuneration increased from $0.47M to $0.63M, an increase that is 
statistically significant at the 1% level. In comparison, there is no indication that the mean 
level of non-equity remuneration shifted significantly following the introduction of the ‘Two 
Strikes’ rule. With respect to equity remuneration, the results in Table 2 Panel C indicate that 
there were statistically significant increases in four of the ten industries included in the 
sample. This phenomenon may indicate that boards shifted their preferences in contract 
design towards greater performance-based remuneration in the post-2012 period, alongside a 
relative stagnation in the growth of non-equity remuneration. These findings also reinforce 
the notion that non-equity remuneration remained the most significant component of CEO 
pay in large Australian firms, in contrast to executive pay design in the larger economies of 
the US and UK.  
 In addition to univariate tests of dissent and remuneration, tests of mean and median 
differences are also conducted for the control variables included in regression models. Mean 
and median industry-adjusted TSR did not fluctuate significantly between pre and post 
regulatory periods. This is in direct contrast to the increase in mean remuneration observed 
over the sample period. Further, key governance variables including Board independence, 
Remuneration Committee Inside/Outside ratio and Director Busyness strengthened. The ratio 
of ‘insider’ to ‘outsider’ board members sitting on the remuneration committee declined to 
almost zero in the post-regulation period. This result aligns with expectations, as the ASX 
listing rule 12.8, which mandated that remuneration committees be solely composed of non-
executive directors, was introduced at the same time as the ‘Two Strikes’ legislation. This 
control variable is important in capturing the effect of shifting structural changes in 
remuneration committees on shareholder dissent levels. Director Busyness also declined in 
the post-regulation period. This is an interesting finding given that there was no 
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commensurate decline in the mean number of total directors sitting on boards. In the context 
of this study, director busyness acts as a proxy for the capacity of directors to act as effective 
monitors in a given firm vis-à-vis their directorial obligations in other firms. Thus, a 
declining director busyness value may indicate a heightened propensity for directors to 
behave as effective monitors of executive management (Perry and Peyer, 2005; Jiraporn et 
al., 2009).  
 
5.3 Univariate Tests of Strikes 
In support of our findings in Table 2, Table 3 provides useful insights into the general 
difference between ‘strike’ and ‘non-strike’ firms for both periods. For the purposes of 
comparison with actual strikes in the post-regulation period, we construct ‘artificial’ first and 
second ‘strikes’ in the pre-regulation period and identify them as instances where dissent was 
greater than or equal to 25%. In support of our main findings, the univariate analysis in Table 
3 Panel A indicates that mean and median total and non-equity remuneration is higher in high 
dissent firms in the pre-regulation period. In addition, the results in Table 3 Panel A suggest 
that Industry-adjusted Median TSR was lower in high dissent firms. Table 3 Panel B presents 
opposing results to those found in Panel A and indicate that mean and median, total, non-
equity and equity remuneration is lower for ‘strike’ firms relative to ‘non-strike’ firms. This 
result for total CEO pay after 2012 is consistent with the univariate analysis between non-
strike and strike firms in Bugeja et al. (2017). Our results provide an initial indication of the 
influence of the ‘Two Strikes’ rule in dampening CEO pay levels relative to the pre-
regulation period. The results from propensity score matching in Table 8 reinforce the notion 
that ‘strikes’ after the introduction of the ‘Two Strikes’ rule did result in proportional declines 
in CEO pay. In terms of corporate governance characteristics, the results in Table 3 Panel B 
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indicate that mean board size was marginally lower in ‘strike’ firms compared to non-strike 
firms (7.8 to 6.7) consistent with lower levels of director busyness.  
<INSERT TABLE 3 HERE> 
 
5.4 The impact of CEO remuneration on shareholder dissent 
Table 4 includes a set of regressions to gauge the influence of shareholder voting on CEO pay 
for the entire sample period (2005 to 2015). Regression (1) in Table 4 is an ordinary least-
squares analysis of the hypothesised relationship, and regressions (2) to (6) provide 
regression analysis across the quantiles of dissent. In this respect, Table 4 serves as the 
baseline model employed to examine the extent to which CEO pay and other control 
variables are correlated with shareholder dissent for all years in the sample.  
The results in Table 4 support our hypothesis 1 and indicate that CEO pay is a 
positive and statistically significant determinant of shareholder dissent. This result is present 
in regression (1) and across all the quantiles of dissent. The coefficient estimate in regression 
(1) suggests that for a 10% increase in total CEO remuneration, there is an expected 
corresponding increase in shareholder dissent of 0.139%, ceteris paribus.
21
 The quantile 
regressions (2) to (6), indicate that the economic impact of total CEO remuneration on 




 quantiles of dissent. The 90
th
 
quantile regression (6), suggests that a ceteris paribus increase in total remuneration of 10% 
is expected to increase shareholder dissent by 0.298%. Notwithstanding the generally low 
economic significance of the associations, the results do provide an indication that 
shareholders did, to a certain degree, react negatively towards perceived excessive executive 
pay levels.  
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 In this case, the effect of percentage changes in total remuneration on shareholder dissent were calculated as 
?̂? ∙ ln (
[100+𝑝]
100
) where ?̂? is the coefficient on Ln(Total Remuneration) and 𝑝 is the 𝑝% increase in 𝑥 (in this case 
𝑝 = 0.1).  
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Regression (1) in Table 4 provides limited evidence to suggest that CEO tenure, 
internal (board characteristics) and external (Investor Concentration) governance variables 
significantly influence shareholder voting behaviour. Nevertheless, firm performance 
(Industry-adjusted Mean TSR) is a negative and statistically significant determinant of 
shareholder dissent in regression (1) and at the upper quantiles of dissent, lending support to 
hypothesis 3. The result suggests that for a 1% increase in Industry-adjusted Mean TSR, 
dissent is expected to decline by 0.60%, ceteris paribus, indicating that shareholders are more 
likely to vote positively on remuneration reports when the firm is performing well. 
Firm Size (Ln (Total Assets)) is an insignificant determinant of dissent in regression 
(1) and the statistical significance and directionality of the relationship varies substantially 
across the quantiles of dissent. This does not support the notion of a size effect that has been 
found in the extant literature (Smith, 1996; Cai and Walkling, 2011; Cziraki et al., 2010; 
Goranova et al., 2017).  
< INSERT TABLE 4 >  
5.4.1  The impact of CEO pay on shareholder dissent: The ‘Two Strikes’ rule 
In order to measure the effect of the ‘Two Strikes’ rule on the relationship between CEO pay 
and shareholder dissent, Table 5 replicates mean and quantile regression analysis provided in 
Table 4 with the addition of post-2012 dummy interactions. The coefficient on the Post2012 
dummy variable, measuring the mean difference in dissent levels between the CLERP 9 and 
‘Two Strikes’ regimes, is positive and statistically significant at the one percent level. This 




 quantiles of dissent. The economically large 
effect indicates that, in general, shareholders tended to express higher levels of dissent 
towards remuneration reports in the post-2012 period.  
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Despite a positive and significant mean difference in dissent after the implementation 
of the ‘Two Strikes’ rule, the coefficient on the Post2012*Ln(Total Remuneration) 
interaction is negative and statistically significant in regression (1); contrary to hypothesis 2. 
The negative coefficient on this interaction indicates that after 2012, firms experienced lower 
levels of shareholder dissent with respect to CEO pay relative to when they were subject to 
the CLERP 9 legislation. The results align somewhat with Monem and Ng (2013), who find 
that following the introduction of the ‘Two Strikes’ rule, shareholders were more judicious in 
their voting behaviour. The significant and negative result on the Post2012*Ln (Total 
Remuneration) interaction may be an indication of this, in that, for fear of introducing 
increased risk and instability in the corporate governance of the firm, shareholders as rational 
investors, moderated their voting behaviour. Bainbridge (2008) questioned the efficiency of 
Say-on-Pay, and the findings in this study may lend some support to this notion. It may 
however be the case that shareholders behaved more deliberately and carefully in their 
allocation of dissenting votes in the post-regulation period, lest a series of strikes on the 
remuneration report destabilised the governance of the firm. Another interpretation of the 
result is that, following the introduction of the ‘Two Strikes’ rule, shareholders may have 
perceived higher CEO pay as more legitimate, given the greater consequences on boards for 
flawed remuneration design. This is to say that, if the legislation did constrain the decision-
making of boards on pay practices, higher CEO remuneration after the introduction of the 
‘Two Strikes’ rule may have provided an indication to the shareholders of a given firm that 
CEO pay levels were indeed optimal, or at least legitimate, relative to other comparable firms 
in the marketplace.  
The coefficient on the Post2012* Industry-adjusted Mean TSR interaction is negative 
and statistically insignificant. This result may indicate that shareholders, under the more 
stringent ‘Two Strikes’ rule, are less likely to vote positively on remuneration reports as a 
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result of good firm performance, and instead focus more attention on the appropriateness of 
executive pay. Similarly, the effect of firm size on shareholder dissent levels for the pre-2012 
period is minimal; consistent with the baseline estimates in Table 4. However, the coefficient 
on the Post2012* Ln (Total Assets) variable is negative and statistically significant in Table 
5. This result suggests that shareholders of smaller firms have a tendency to express higher 
levels of dissent relative to larger firms after the introduction of the ‘Two Strikes’ rule. This 
result is consistent with the findings presented in Monem and Ng (2013), who suggest that 
smaller firms are more likely to receive a ‘strike’ on their remuneration report given their 
tendency to have weaker corporate governance structures.  
< INSERT TABLE 5 > 
Analysing the impact of internal corporate governance control variables on 
shareholder dissent produced mixed results, with Board Independence and Non-Executive 
Percentage having a minimal impact on shareholder dissent levels in both the ordinary least-
squares analysis and across quantiles in Tables 4 and 5. The only exception, and one that 
conforms to expectation, is the statistically significant and negative coefficient on the Non-
Executive Percentage variable at the 50
th
 quantile of dissent in regression (4) of Table 4. 
Nevertheless, the coefficient on the Post2012*Ln (Total Directors) interaction is positive and 
statistically significant in regression (1) of Table 5. This result indicates that after 2012, firms 
experienced higher levels of shareholder dissent with respect to board size relative to the pre-
regulation period. Alongside the ordinary least-squares regression, the positive influence of 




 quantiles of dissent. This may 
indicate that shareholders are more sensitive to the implications that larger boards may have 
on the achievement of effective contract design under the ‘Two Strikes’ rule. There is 
evidence in the literature to indicate that investors are justified in taking the view that large 
boards have a value-reducing effect. Yermack (1996) highlights that there is a negative 
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association between board size and a firms market value. Furthermore, Dalton et al. (1998) 
indicate that larger boards are generally more inefficient in their decision-making capability 
due to free-riding problems.  
 
5.5 The influence of dissent on CEO pay 
Given the finding that CEO pay is a positive and statistically significant predictor of dissent, 
it is important to identify whether or not shareholder dissent in previous financial years 
moderated CEO pay. Further, and in particular, it is important to estimate how the shift in 
shareholder voting regimes influenced this relationship. In order to measure the effect of 
lagged dissent on CEO remuneration, we follow Gregory-Smith et al. (2014) and fit a linear 
spline in both ordinary least-squares and quantile regressions, with a knot at the sample mean 
value of dissent.
22
 The spline and knot are identified by 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−1 <= 8.22% and 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−1 > 8.22%, and indicate the effect of dissent levels in the previous financial year 
on Ln(Total Remuneration), in instances where dissent is below and above the sample mean, 
respectively. In addition, Tables 6 and 7 examine the relationship between conventional 
determinants of CEO remuneration in the corporate governance literature. The purpose of 
setting a mean knot on the linear spline is to gauge the effectiveness of above mean dissent 
on CEO pay. Furthermore, this approach facilitates comparability between the pre-regulation 
and post-regulation panels given that prior to 2012 voting was advisory and therefore there 
were no ‘strikes’ against remuneration reports.  
< INSERT TABLE 6 > 
< INSERT TABLE 7 > 
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 The knot is set at 8.22% in accordance with the sample mean level of dissent in Table 1 Panel A. Given the 
skewness of the data, as illustrated in Figure 1, we conduct additional regressions with the knot set at the median 
level of dissent (3.44%) and find no material differences in the results. For brevity, the results for the additional 
regressions are not presented, but are available on request. 
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With respect to the key relationship under consideration, the coefficients on 






 quantile regressions 
in Table 6 indicate a positive relationship between dissent in the previous financial year and 
CEO pay in instances where dissent was below the sample mean level. This positive 
relationship at lower levels of dissent, despite not supporting hypothesis 4, may indicate that 
boards viewed relatively low levels of dissent as an indication that shareholders were 
supportive, or at the very least apathetic, towards CEO pay levels. Low dissent, therefore, 
essentially granted boards with license to increase CEO pay in subsequent periods. This 
finding is consistent with that observed by Gregory-Smith et al. (2014), who also find that 
low levels of shareholder dissent do not constrain executive pay growth. Table 7 presents 
results on the impact of the ‘Two Strikes’ rule on the determination of CEO pay. The 
coefficient on the Post2012*𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−1 > 8.22% interaction is negative and statistically 
significant in regression (1). This result supports hypothesis 5, and suggests that under the 
‘Two Strikes’ rule, CEO pay is decreasing in shareholder dissent in instances where dissent is 
above the sample mean level relative to the CLERP 9 regime. Thus, there is evidence to 
suggest that following the introduction of the ‘Two Strikes’ rule in Australia, boards were 
more responsive in reforming CEO pay practices relative to the CLERP 9 regime.  
According to Tables 6 and 7, coefficient estimates on CEO, board and firm control 
variables produce mixed results. The coefficients on firm and CEO controls in Tables 6 and 7 
including firm performance (Industry-adjusted Mean TSR), firm size (Ln(Total Assets)) and 
CEO tenure (Ln(CEO Tenure)) concur with expectations established in the extant literature. 
The positive and statistically significant coefficient on the firm performance variable suggests 
there is some degree of alignment between pay and performance for firms in the sample. The 
coefficient on firm size, as expected, indicates a positive and statistically significant impact 
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of firm size on CEO pay.
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 Furthermore, CEO tenure is a positive and statistically significant 
determinant of CEO pay; consistent with the notion of ‘board capture’ (Bebchuk and Fried, 
2004). Main et al. (1995) present evidence to suggest that as tenure increases, CEOs are able 
to obtain greater influence over the remuneration committee and Bebchuk and Fried (2004) 
indicate that relationships between the CEO and board members strengthen over time, further 
increasing the influence of the CEO over the board.  
With respect to internal corporate governance, results in Table 6 indicate that 
Ln(Total Directors), the board size indicator, is a positive and statistically significant 
determinant of CEO pay in the upper quantiles. This concurs with key empirical findings in 
the literature suggesting that CEO pay is increasing in board size, and supports the notion that 
larger boards lead to decreases in efficient decision-making and increased free-riding 
behaviour (Yermack, 1996; Dalton et al., 1998; Core et al., 1999). Similarly, the effects of 
director busyness (Ln (Director Busyness)) conform to expectation. Director busyness in 
Table 6 and 7 has a positive and statistically significant effect on CEO remuneration. This 
result is consistent with other empirical findings in the literature and indicates that, as the 
number of outside board positions held by board members increases, the monitoring 
capability of the board as a whole declines (Core et al., 1999; Perry and Peyer, 2005; Fich 
and Shivdasani, 2006; Jiraporn et al., 2009).  
Conventional theory and findings in the empirical literature indicate that increased 
board independence and lower levels of managerial and ‘insider’ presence on boards and 
board committees are expected to aid in constraining CEO remuneration. Nevertheless, the 
results provided in Tables 6 and 7 suggest a positive and statistically significant relationship 
between the measures of board independence (Board Independence and Non-Executive 
Percentage) and CEO pay. At the same time, Remuneration committee independence 
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 Larger firms are able to procure more talented (and therefore more expensive) CEOs within the ‘market for 
executives’ (Rosen, 1992). 
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(Remuneration Committee Inside/Outside Ratio) is found to be a negative and statistically 
significant determinant of CEO pay. This result suggests that an increased proportion of 
‘insider’ directors on the remuneration committee (relative to ‘outsiders’) aids in constraining 
CEO pay. Fama and Jensen (1983) indicate that the ability for ‘outsider’ board members to 
execute their roles effectively is hampered by their lack of information regarding the 
functioning of the firm (and the firm’s management) relative to ‘insider’ appointees. This 
earlier literature supports more recent suggestions that structural board (and board 
committee) independence may act as a form of ‘window dressing’, allowing firms to adhere 
to specified corporate governance principles, whilst simultaneously electing outsider directors 
who are sympathetic to management (Romano, 2005). In the Australian context, Capezio et 
al. (2011) find that firms which exhibit structural board independence are no more effective 
in monitoring CEO pay, relative to boards dominated by executives. Interestingly, when the 
firm, CEO and corporate governance control variables are interacted with the Post2012 
dummy variable in Table 7, the incremental effects of these variables are insignificant. This 
result might indicate, that following the introduction of the ‘Two Strikes’ rule, shareholder 
voting behaviour, as a constraining force, may have had a more substantiative influence on 
CEO pay determination, relative to the conventional determinants of pay. This notion is 
supported by the statistically significant and negative coefficient on the 
Post2012*𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−1 > 8.22% interaction in regression (1) of Table 7. Comparing this 
result, with the positive and statistically significant coefficient on 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−1 > 8.22% in 
regression (1) of Table 7, might indicate the relative inability of the CLERP 9 advisory voting 
regime to constrain CEO pay prior to 2012. 
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5.5.1 The influence of ‘strikes’ on CEO pay 
Given the mixed results in the literature on the influence of shareholder dissent on CEO pay, 
matching methods seem an appropriate approach for testing the robustness of the main 
findings in this paper.
24
 Propensity score matching, as a means by which to measure average 
treatment effects in applied econometrics, has developed substantially since the work of 
Rubin (1980) and Rosenbaum and Rubin (1984, 1985).
25
 The use of propensity score 
matching techniques on observational data overcomes the ‘curse of dimensionality’ in the 
measurement of treatment effects (Ho et al., 2007). Another advantage to this method is that 
it facilitates the measurement of average treatment effects on an outcome (in this case, 
changes to CEO pay) in instances where there is potential for selection bias in the assignment 
of treatments (‘strike’ occurrences). Our set of propensity score analyses are presented in 
Table 8 and measure whether first and second ‘strikes’ in the previous financial year resulted 
in a change in total CEO pay on treated firms.
26
 We follow a similar approach to that of 
Stathopoulos and Voulgaris (2016), in that we employ several algorithms including kernel, 
radius and nearest neighbor (one-to-one and one-to-many) to match treatment and control 
groups. In our analysis, propensity scores are estimated before the treatment effect, and 
therefore all standard errors of the treatment effect estimate are bootstrapped.
27
  
< INSERT TABLE 8 > 
In Table 8, we replace above-mean dissent with binary variables for both first and 
second ‘strikes’. Results in Table 8 Panel A and B are consistent with our main results and 
suggest that there was minimal change to total CEO pay as a result of high dissent against 
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25
 See also Imbens (2004), Ho et al. (2007), Stuart (2010) and Brooks and Ohsfeldt (2013) for recent 
developments on propensity score matching methods. 
26
 Given that the ‘strikes’ in Panel A and B occur during the pre-regulation period, they are identified as 
instances where shareholder dissent against the remuneration report was greater than or equal to 25%. 
27
 Given the uncertainty associated with estimating propensity scores, the bootstrapping of standard errors 
reduces the likelihood that standard errors are biased in the estimation of the average treatment effect on the 
treated (ATT) (Austin, 2009; Abadie and Imbens, 2016). 
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remuneration reports in the pre-regulation period. Further, Table 8 Panel C presents results 
which lend support to the main finding that the introduction of the ‘Two strikes’ rule did 
result in boards curbing CEO pay following instances of high shareholder dissent at the 
previous annual general meeting. Nevertheless, the results in Table 8 Panel D suggest no 
subsequent reduction in CEO pay in firms incurring a second ‘strike’. This result contrasts 
substantially with the findings in Monem and Ng (2013) where second ‘strike’ firms reduced 
CEO pay by a significantly greater margin relative to first ‘strike’ firms. The results in Panel 
D may be due to the small number of second ‘strike’ firms in the post-regulation panel and 
the fact that none of the observed second ‘strike’ firms passed a ‘spill resolution’ at the same 
annual general meeting. Our results from propensity score matching align with the our main 
findings which suggest that the ‘Two Strikes’ rule had a disciplining effect on board decision-
making with respect to CEO pay. 
 
5.6 Market reactions 
5.6.1 Market reactions up to and including the introduction of the ‘Two Strike’ rule 
In order to examine investor perceptions of the introduction of the ‘Two Strikes’ rule, 
conventional event studies analysing cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) are 
considered. Cumulative abnormal returns are calculated using the market model, with an 
estimation window of 120 days to 10 days prior to the event dates. This event study approach 
is also employed to measure market reactions to first and second ‘strikes’.
 28
 We avoid using 
average buy-and-hold returns (ABHARs) to measure the long-run implications of the ‘Two 
Strikes’ rule introduction for a number of reasons. The most immediate issue with studying 
long-event windows is the difficulty in controlling for confounding events. Secondly, the 
potential for correlations amongst residuals increases with long-event windows, resulting in a 
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downward bias in standard errors. Furthermore, there is the general lack of power in testing 
longer event windows, which can lead to either over or under rejection of the null hypothesis 
(McWilliams and Siegel, 1997).  
Table 9 presents market reactions to the introduction of the ‘Two Strike’ rule as well 
as three other key events leading up to its implementation date. Event one, titled ‘PC Report 
Released’ is the date the Productivity Commission released their findings from their report on 
the regulation of director and executive remuneration. The second event titled ‘Public 
Consultation’ is the date at which the draft amendments to the Corporations Act 2011 (Cth) 
(Austl.) were released for public consultation. The third event titled ‘Bill Registered’ is the 
date at which the bill was registered (indicating its approval by the Senate). The fourth and 
final event, is the date of the introduction of the ‘Two Strikes’ rule, at the commencement of 
the 2012 financial year. Table 9 presents cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) for 
these four events. 
< INSERT TABLE 9 > 
The results from Table 9 indicate that the events were generally perceived as 
beneficial by the market. Event 1, the release of the Productivity Commissions corporate 
governance reform recommendations, garnered positive and statistically significant CAARs 
of between 10.18% and 11.81%. Furthermore, events 3 and 4, which indicate the approval 
and implementation of the Corporations Amendment (Improving Accountability on Director 
and Executive Remuneration) Act 2011 (Cth) (Austl.), resulted in positive and statistically 
significant CAARs, despite the magnitude of the reaction being significantly lower when 
compared to the CAARs measured for event 1. The positive market reaction to the 
introduction of the ‘Two Strikes’ rule support hypothesis 6 and are consistent with findings in 
Cai and Walkling (2011) and Ferri and Maber (2013). The results are however, in direct 
contrast to findings in Larcker et al. (2011) and Hitz and Müller-Bloch (2015). Both studies 
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reinforce the arguments of Bainbridge (2008) and Mangen and Magnan (2011) which regard 
further regulation of executive pay as a constraint on the contracting process. The finding of a 
positive reaction to the instalment of the ‘Two Strikes’ rule is unique in the literature and 
supports the notion that investors perceived enhanced shareholder voting powers over 
executive remuneration as value-increasing. 
 
5.6.2 Market reactions to first and second ‘strikes’ 
To ensure consistency and comparability between market reactions to dissent under both the 
CLERP 9 and ‘Two Strikes’ regimes we construct, what we term, ‘artificial strikes’ for the 
pre-regulation period. We define ‘artificial strikes’ as instances where shareholder dissent 
was greater than or equal to 25%, which is consistent with the definition of ‘strike’ under the 
‘Two Strikes’ rule. Given the advisory nature of voting in the years prior to the introduction 
of the ‘Two Strikes’ rule we do not observe significant reactions to high dissent against 
remuneration reports at AGMs prior to 2012 in Panel A of Table 10. Considering the nature 
of shareholder voting under the CLERP 9 advisory regime, it could be assumed that 
substantially negative votes towards remuneration reports would not trigger strong negative 
market reactions. In contrast, after the imposition of the ‘Two Strikes’ rule in 2012, we 
observe significant and negative CAARs for all event windows for first ‘strike’ firms in Panel 
B of Table 10. Interestingly, firms experiencing a second ‘strike’ are not faced with 
significantly negative CAARs. This may be due to the low number of observed second 
‘strike’ firms in the dataset, as well as the fact that none of the second ‘strike’ firms in the 
post-regulation panel passed ‘spill resolutions’ at the same annual general meeting. This 
demonstrates to the market that, despite a second ‘strike’ against the remuneration report, a 
majority of shareholders did not believe that perceived failures in executive pay design 
warranted a board ‘spill’. 
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< INSERT TABLE 10 > 
 In general, the results in Table 10 provide evidence to suggest that the market viewed 
‘strike’ instances as value-destroying in the post-regulation period. Furthermore, prior to the 
introduction of the ‘Two Strikes’ rule, there was a general lack of negative investor sentiment 




Our regression results suggest that CEO pay is a positive and statistically significant 
determinant of shareholder dissent across all regression specifications. Interestingly, the 
incremental effect of CEO pay on shareholder dissent after 2012 is found to be negative and 
statistically significant. This could suggest that the ‘Two Strikes’ rule may have reduced the 
tendency for shareholders to exercise their voting rights as liberally as they had done under 
CLERP 9. In terms of the moderating role of shareholder dissent, the evidence highlights that 
during the advisory voting period (2005-2011) shareholder dissent did not aid in constraining 
CEO pay and at lower levels of dissent may have encouraged boards to increase it. In 
contrast, dissent constrained CEO pay after 2012, conditional on high dissent (above the 
sample mean level). Additional analysis of first and second ‘strikes’ after 2012 support these 
findings. Our analysis of market reactions to events leading up to and including the 
introduction of the ‘Two Strikes’ rule indicate that the market perceived this change in Say-
on-Pay regime as value-increasing. In addition, the ‘Two Strikes’ rule generated negative 
market reactions for firms experiencing first ‘strikes’ after 2012. 
In terms of significance, this paper is the first to our knowledge that considers the 
implications of a transition from advisory Say-on-Pay to a more stringent regime within a 
single country. The key finding being that once boards were faced with greater penalties due 
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to substantially negative Say-on-Pay results, they curbed CEO pay subject to high levels of 
shareholder dissent. Furthermore, we expand on existing ‘Two Strikes’ studies by measuring 
the market reaction to events leading up to and including the regulations introduction. The 
results suggest that, in general, investors perceived the ‘Two Strikes’ rule to be a value-
increasing regulation. These two findings coupled together, are of particular importance to 
policymakers in the larger UK and US economies which may seek to modify their existing 
advisory Say-on-Pay regimes in a similar fashion. 
 Say-on-Pay in Australia may, however, have additional consequences for the agency 
relationship in firms. The role of proxy advisors, remuneration consultants, CEO turnover 
and changes to shareholder wealth, as determinants or consequences of shareholder dissent 
are beyond the scope of this study, but serve as potential areas for future research. From our 
results we find that the market did respond positively to the announcement and eventual 
introduction of the ‘Two Strikes’ rule. This finding however, should not imply that the 
introduction of this type of regulation necessarily enhances shareholder wealth. Göx et al. 
(2014) conduct a laboratory experiment on the trade-off between incentive alignment and 
hold-up problems brought about by binding Say-on-Pay. They find that binding Say-on-Pay 
has the potential to diminish ex-ante CEO incentives and impair firm value. Wagner and 
Wenk (2017) test this trade-off in their study of Say-on-Pay in Switzerland. The unique 
regulatory setting in Switzerland, where shareholders are able to engage in both ex-post 
voting on executive pay and ex-ante bonus allotments facilitated this study. They find that 
increasing shareholder power for the purposes of incentive alignment may also induce hold-
up problems, and conclude that unabated increases in shareholder power over the contracting 
process may be sub-optimal. Although analysing this trade-off is a compelling avenue for 
empirical research, it has not been pursued in this paper as there seem to be no distinct or 
collectively acknowledged measures of the magnitude of the hold-up problem in the 
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empirical literature. Secondly, the channel has received little attention outside of exercises in 
theory, as it is highly contingent on data availability and an appropriate regulatory setting.  
In addition, the association between CEO turnover and shareholder dissent is a factor 
worthy of further exploration. Alissa (2015) and Bugeja et al. (2017) suggest that the 
probability of CEO turnover is increasing in shareholder dissent. However, given the general 
inability to establish the causal mechanisms for CEO departure, either forced or voluntary, an 
analysis of CEO turnover is beyond the scope of this study. Despite the limitations, it is 
hoped this paper provides some early insights for policymakers on the implications of 
implementing changes to advisory shareholder voting regimes. 
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Appendix 1: Variable definitions 
Variable Definition Source 
Dissent To ensure consistency with Clarkson et al. (2011) and Monem and 
Ng (2013) in the Australian literature, shareholder dissent is 
calculated as the number of ‘no’ votes divided by the summation of 
‘no’ and ‘yes’ votes on the remuneration report in a given firm-year. 
Voting data prior to the commencement of the 2012 financial year 
was hand-collected from the Morningstar DatAnalysis database and 
post-2012 voting data was accessed from Bloomberg LP. Dissent is 
expressed as a percentage in all regressions. 
Bloomberg LP 
Morningstar DatAnalysis 
Total Remuneration The summation of Salary, Bonus, Equity and Option remuneration 
received by the CEO in a given firm-year, expressed as a natural 
logarithm in all regressions. Values are adjusted for inflation. 
Exchange rate adjustments were made when remuneration figures 
were quoted in currencies other than Australian dollars. 
Thomson Reuters Connect4 
Boardroom 
Non-Equity Remuneration The summation of Salary and Bonus remuneration received by the 
CEO in a given firm-year, expressed as a natural logarithm in 
regressions. Values are adjusted for inflation. Exchange rate 
adjustments were made when remuneration figures were quoted in 
currencies other than Australian dollars. 
Thomson Reuters Connect4 
Boardroom 
Equity Remuneration The summation of Equity and Option remuneration received by the 
CEO in a given firm-year, expressed as a natural logarithm in 
regressions. Values are adjusted for inflation. Exchange rate 
adjustments were made when remuneration figures were quoted in 
currencies other than Australian dollars. 
Thomson Reuters Connect4 
Boardroom 
Tenure The number of years since the appointment of the CEO, expressed as 
a natural logarithm in all regressions. 
Thomson Reuters Connect4 
Boardroom 
Industry-adjusted Mean TSR Industry-adjusted total shareholder return, calculated as the inflation 
and industry return-adjusted mean annual holding period return of 
adjusted closing prices. 
Bloomberg LP 
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Industry-adjusted Median TSR Industry-adjusted total shareholder return, calculated as the inflation 
and industry return-adjusted median annual holding period return of 
adjusted closing prices. 
Bloomberg LP 
Total Assets The inflation-adjusted balance sheet value of total assets. Total asset 
figures were exchange rate adjusted when they were quoted in 
currencies other than Australian dollars. Total Assets was expressed 
as a natural logarithm in all regressions. 
Morningstar DatAnalysis 
Total Directors The total number of directors on the board, expressed as a natural 
logarithm in all regressions. 
Thomson Reuters Connect4 
Boardroom 
Board Independence The total number of independent directors as a proportion of total 
directors. 




The number of insider directors on a firm’s remuneration committee 
as a proportion of total remuneration committee positions. 
Thomson Reuters Connect4 
Boardroom 
Director Busyness The number of outside directorship positions held by board members 
in a given firm, expressed as a natural logarithm in all regressions. 
Variable construction is consistent with Perry and Peyer (2005) and 
Jiraporn et al. (2009). 
Thomson Reuters Connect4 
Boardroom 
Investor Concentration The Herfindahl–Hirschman Index of the top 20 shareholders for a 
given firm. 
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Figure 1: Shareholder dissent: Median trends 
 
Figure 1 presents stem and leaf plots of shareholder dissent levels for the entire sample period. The vertical axis 
is the percentage of shareholder dissent and the horizontal axis denotes financial year. This figure is a visual 
representation of the summary statistics on shareholder dissent provided in Table 1 Panel A. The distribution of 
dissent is significantly positively skewed for each year in the sample, with skewness decreasing prior to and 
during the Global Financial Crisis (2007-2009). In addition, the positive skewness of the distribution of dissent 












Table 1: Summary statistics 
Panel A: Shareholder Dissent  
Dissent 
Year Mean Median SD 10th Percentile 90th Percentile 
2005 0.0461 0.0188 0.0747 0.0004 0.1091 
2006 0.0634 0.0246 0.1011 0.0007 0.1763 
2007 0.0724 0.0300 0.1150 0.0019 0.1658 
2008 0.0972 0.0485 0.1302 0.0038 0.2764 
2009 0.0965 0.0428 0.1356 0.0079 0.2831 
2010 0.0874 0.0396 0.1317 0.0034 0.2305 
2011 0.1095 0.0517 0.1420 0.0080 0.3181 
2012 0.0792 0.0352 0.0996 0.0072 0.2170 
2013 0.0762 0.0332 0.1183 0.0089 0.1746 
2014 0.0818 0.0336 0.1216 0.0056 0.2199 
2015 0.0815 0.0280 0.1286 0.0035 0.2530 
Total 0.0822 0.0344 0.1217 0.0034 0.2220 
Panel B: CEO Remuneration divided into Total, Equity and Non-Equity Remuneration 
Remuneration Type  Year Mean Median SD 10th Percentile 90th Percentile 
Total Remuneration ($M) 
2005 1.527 0.699 1.979 0.218 4.167 
2006 1.607 0.778 1.876 0.283 4.017 
2007 1.927 0.876 2.523 0.251 4.530 
2008 1.919 0.880 2.590 0.245 4.902 
2009 1.851 0.935 2.191 0.279 4.745 
2010 1.867 1.007 2.219 0.294 4.796 
2011 2.186 1.308 2.032 0.447 5.073 
2012 2.308 1.484 2.178 0.511 5.713 
2013 1.847 1.087 1.915 0.364 4.269 
2014 2.136 1.238 2.311 0.475 5.046 
2015 1.945 1.149 2.233 0.453 4.455 
Total 1.925 1.063 2.212 0.319 4.855 
Equity Remuneration ($M) 
2005 0.262 0.013 0.575 0.000 0.826 
2006 0.353 0.084 0.647 0.000 0.921 
2007 0.462 0.104 0.886 0.000 1.223 
2008 0.497 0.118 0.933 0.000 1.451 
2009 0.492 0.087 0.992 0.000 1.318 
Total e uneration ($ ) 
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2010 0.509 0.112 0.996 0.000 1.584 
2011 0.636 0.193 1.016 0.000 1.808 
2012 0.717 0.207 1.189 0.000 2.194 
2013 0.568 0.206 0.991 0.000 1.648 
2014 0.677 0.204 1.262 0.000 1.853 
2015 0.570 0.135 1.282 0.000 1.502 
Total 0.528 0.139 1.016 0.000 1.542 
Non-Equity Remuneration ($M) 
2005 1.265 0.544 1.716 0.181 3.719 
2006 1.254 0.589 1.490 0.196 3.097 
2007 1.464 0.677 1.973 0.236 3.613 
2008 1.422 0.674 1.918 0.220 3.492 
2009 1.359 0.757 1.407 0.252 3.542 
2010 1.358 0.823 1.396 0.234 3.353 
2011 1.550 1.049 1.242 0.436 3.510 
2012 1.591 1.064 1.234 0.476 3.439 
2013 1.279 0.866 1.086 0.337 2.886 
2014 1.460 0.936 1.233 0.455 3.218 
2015 1.375 0.921 1.200 0.402 2.963 
Total 1.397 0.831 1.466 0.283 3.378 
Panel C: Control Variables  
Control Variables N Mean Median SD 10th Percentile 90th Percentile   
Investor Concentration (HIH Index) 
2083 
0.057 0.0257 0.091 0.003 0.131   
Remuneration Committee Inside 
Outside Ratio (%) 
0.046 0.0000 0.129 0 0.250 
  
Director Busyness (#) 14.494 14.0000 8.385 4 25   
Total Directors (#) 7.734 7.0000 2.584 5 11   
Board Independence (%) 0.523 0.5714 0.249 0.143 0.833   
Tenure (Years) 7.716 6.3288 4.916 2.459 14.373   
Total Assets ($M) 13981 451.4 71343 28.935 9458   
Industry Adjusted Median TSR (%) 0.0997 0.0000 0.7158 -0.3604 0.5600  





Table 2: Tests of difference between ‘Post’ and ‘Pre’ regulation samples 
Panel A: All Variables 
Variable 
Post-2012 (n = 776) Pre-2012 (n = 1307) Tests of Difference 
Mean Median Mean Median Paired t-stat Z test 
Dissent (%) 0.0795 0.0325 0.0837 0.0361 -0.76 0.3 
Total Remuneration ($M) 2.0479 1.2147 1.8521 0.9481 1.96** 5.53*** 
Non-Equity Remuneration ($M) 1.4184 0.9409 1.3842 0.7315 0.52 5.76** 
Equity Remuneration ($M) 0.6295 0.1919 0.4679 0.0989 3.52*** 5.38*** 
Tenure (Years) 6.5448 5.4658 8.4119 7.1808 -8.52*** -10.10*** 
Industry-adjusted Median TSR (%) 0.0921 0.0000 0.1042 0.0000 0.3719 -0.5024 
Industry-adjusted Mean TSR (%) -0.0144 -0.0437 -0.0133 -0.0608 0.0335 0.1994 
Total Assets ($M) 16770 604 12324 328 1.38 6.70*** 
Total Directors (#) 7.7229 7.00 7.7399 7.00 -0.14 0.55 
Board Independence (%) 0.5674 0.60 0.4968 0.50 6.31*** 7.00*** 
Remuneration Committee Inside 
Outside Ratio (%) 
0.0144 0 0.0644 0 -8.72*** -8.63*** 
Director Busyness (#) 11.7474 12 16.1255 15 -11.90*** -10.63*** 
Investor Concentration (HIH Index) 0.0605 0.0298 0.0545 0.0241 1.46 2.72*** 
This panel presents the results of Paired t-tests and Wilcoxon rank-sum tests between pre and post regulatory periods, with the units of measure for each variable 
provided in parentheses. The pre-regulatory period includes financial years from 2005 to 2011 and the post-regulatory period extends from 2012 to 2015.  The figures 
presented in bold identify statistically significant t and Z-test results when comparing the sub-samples over time. Significance levels are identified with the following 
notation *, ** and *** which indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel B:  Shareholder Dissent by Industry for ‘Post’ and ‘Pre’ regulation samples 
Two-Digit GICS Industry Sector 
Post-2012 Pre-2012 Tests of Difference 
N Mean Median N Mean Median Paired t-stat Z test 
Consumer Staples 38 0.0593 0.0339 70 0.0866 0.0424 -1.3 -1.02 
Consumer Discretionary 121 0.0828 0.0331 187 0.0813 0.0467 0.11 -0.52 
Industrials 113 0.0725 0.0262 188 0.1067 0.0452 -2.24** -2.14** 
Materials 180 0.0841 0.0334 313 0.0817 0.0246 0.19 2.25** 
Financials 133 0.0759 0.0280 210 0.0802 0.0452 -0.35 -1.68 
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Health Care 62 0.0941 0.0446 107 0.0637 0.0279 2.08** 2.81*** 
Utilities 9 0.0983 0.0873 12 0.134 0.0723 -0.52 0.71 
Information Technology 32 0.0797 0.0433 64 0.0777 0.0292 0.06 0.82 
Energy 78 0.078 0.0342 143 0.0753 0.0309 0.17 0.07 
Telecommunication Services 10 0.0654 0.0137 13 0.1205 0.0095 -0.71 0.12 
This panel presents the results of Paired t-tests and Wilcoxon rank-sum tests for shareholder dissent by industry, between pre and post regulatory periods, with mean 
and median figures expressed as the number of ‘no’ votes on a given remuneration report as a proportion of the sum of ‘yes’ and ‘no’ votes. The pre-regulatory period 
includes financial years from 2005 to 2011 and the post-regulatory period extends from 2012 to 2015.  The figures presented in bold identify statistically significant t 
and Z-test results when comparing the sub-samples over time. Significance levels are identified with the following notation *, ** and *** which indicate significance 
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel C: CEO Remuneration by Industry for ‘Post’ and ‘Pre’ regulation samples 
Two-Digit GICS Industry Sector 
Post-2012 Pre-2012 Tests of Difference 
N Mean Median N Mean Median Paired t-stat Z test 
Total Remuneration 
        Consumer Staples 38 2.1781 1.0610 70 2.3892 1.1078 -0.44 -0.03 
Consumer Discretionary 121 1.5563 1.2774 187 1.3835 0.9902 1.11 2.00** 
Industrials 113 1.9184 1.3348 188 1.4654 0.9542 2.61*** 4.46*** 
Materials 180 1.9949 0.8928 313 1.7981 0.7106 0.83 2.36** 
Financials 133 2.8721 2.1378 210 3.1381 2.2317 -0.83 0.13 
Health Care 62 2.0168 1.0108 107 1.2591 0.6222 2.81*** 2.86*** 
Utilities 9 2.4522 1.0731 12 2.4978 1.2753 -0.04 0.78 
Information Technology 32 1.1777 0.9488 64 0.9721 0.6823 1.41 2.44** 
Energy 78 1.9471 1.2201 143 1.5803 0.7934 1.43 2.48** 
Telecommunication Services 10 2.3608 0.7398 13 3.4213 0.6476 -0.67 0.19 
Non-Equity Remuneration                 
Consumer Staples 38 1.8146 0.9709 70 1.8954 0.8492 -0.21 -0.04 
Consumer Discretionary 121 1.2168 1.0222 187 1.1617 0.8300 0.54 1.71* 
Industrials 113 1.4265 0.9978 188 1.1884 0.8218 1.85* 3.99*** 
Materials 180 1.2609 0.7575 313 1.2846 0.5421 -0.16 3.54*** 
Financials 133 1.8752 1.6195 210 2.2842 1.6972 -1.91* -0.61 
Health Care 62 1.3765 0.7485 107 0.9056 0.4484 2.78*** 2.91*** 
Utilities 9 1.6709 0.6811 12 1.5254 0.6752 0.24 0.92 
Information Technology 32 0.8841 0.7902 64 0.7019 0.6473 2.69*** 2.62*** 
Energy 78 1.3116 0.8444 143 1.146 0.5351 0.96 2.56*** 
Telecommunication Services 10 1.5979 0.6673 13 2.312 0.6476 -0.73 0.00 
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Equity Remuneration                 
Consumer Staples 38 0.3635 0.1325 70 0.4938 0.0998 -0.89 -0.28 
Consumer Discretionary 121 0.3393 0.1683 187 0.2218 0.0695 1.54 2.73*** 
Industrials 113 0.4918 0.2158 188 0.277 0.0661 3.12*** 4.48*** 
Materials 180 0.7341 0.1129 313 0.5137 0.0593 1.78* 0.9 
Financials 133 0.9968 0.5780 210 0.854 0.2703 1.02 1.74* 
Health Care 62 0.6403 0.2263 107 0.3535 0.0697 2.22** 2.04** 
Utilities 9 0.7814 0.4408 12 0.973 0.4464 -0.32 0.21 
Information Technology 32 0.2936 0.1274 64 0.2703 0.0281 0.23 2.44* 
Energy 78 0.6354 0.2369 143 0.4343 0.1709 1.95* 2.09** 
Telecommunication Services 10 0.7629 0.0842 13 1.1074 0.0000 -0.45 0.86 
This panel presents the results of Paired t-tests and Wilcoxon rank-sum tests between pre and post regulatory total, non-equity and equity remuneration by industry 
with mean and median figures in $M. Firm industries are identified at the two-digit GICS classification level. The pre-regulatory period includes financial years from 
2005 to 2011 and the post-regulatory period extends from 2012 to 2015.  The figures presented in bold identify statistically significant t and Z-test results when 













Table 3: Tests of difference between strike and non-strike firms 
Panel A: 'Pre' regulation univariate tests     
Variable 
Non-Strike (n = 1189) Strike (n = 118) Tests of Difference 
Mean Median Mean Median Paired t-stat Z test 
Total Remuneration ($M) 1.8145 0.9291 2.2301 1.3107 -1.92* -2.97*** 
Non-Equity Remuneration ($M) 1.3552 0.7124 1.6763 1.006 -2.07** -2.56** 
Equity Remuneration ($M) 0.4594 0.0989 0.5539 0.1023 -1.09 -0.88 
Tenure (Years) 8.4723 7.2164 7.8028 6.3781 1.43 1.32 
Industry-adjusted Median TSR (%) 0.1118 0 0.027 -0.0148 1.34 2.17** 
Industry-adjusted Mean TSR (%) -0.0077 -0.0578 -0.0702 -0.0841 1.01 1.42 
Total Assets ($M) 13168 307 3818 524 1.58 -2.06** 
Total Directors (#) 7.7267 7 7.8729 8 -0.56 -0.58 
Board Independence (%) 0.4937 1 0.5282 0.5635 -1.46 -1.4 
Remuneration Committee Inside Outside 
Ratio (%) 
0.064 0 0.0682 0 -0.28 -0.75 
Director Busyness (#) 16.0093 15 17.2966 15 -1.67* -2.01** 
Investor Concentration (HIH Index) 0.0552 0.0246 0.0471 0.0216 0.93 0.17 
Panel B: 'Post' regulation univariate tests 
Variable 
Non-Strike (n = 714) Strike (n = 62) Tests of Difference 
Mean Median Mean Median Paired t-stat Z test 
Total Remuneration ($M) 2.1141 1.2347 1.2862 1.1122 2.91*** 2.35** 
Non-Equity Remuneration ($M) 1.4524 0.9466 1.0271 0.8443 2.71*** 2.08** 
Equity Remuneration ($M) 0.6616 0.1999 0.259 0.107 2.59*** 2.55** 
Tenure (Years) 6.4777 5.4521 7.3173 5.5836 -1.32 -1.04 
Industry-adjusted Median TSR (%) 0.0975 0 0.0303 -0.0377 0.63 1.34 
Industry-adjusted Mean TSR (%) -0.0076 -0.0422 -0.0927 -0.0851 0.79 1.06 
Total Assets ($M) 18144 633 947 263 1.52 3.77*** 
Total Directors (#) 7.8067 7 6.7581 6 3.36*** 3.28*** 
Board Independence (%) 0.5679 1 0.5615 1 0.2 0.02 
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Remuneration Committee Inside Outside 
Ratio (%) 
0.0144 0 0.014 0 0.06 0.3 
Director Busyness (#) 12.0826 12 7.8871 9 3.84*** 3.99*** 
Investor Concentration (HIH Index) 0.0607 0.0308 0.0586 0.0205 0.17 0.97 
 
This table presents the results of Paired t-tests and Wilcoxon rank-sum tests between ‘non-strike’ and ‘strike’ firms in both pre and post-
regulation timeframes. The pre-regulation first and second ‘strikes’ represent instances where firms received dissent on their remuneration 
reports of 25% or higher, commensurate with actual strike occurrences in the post-regulation period. The pre-regulatory period includes 
financial years from 2005 to 2011 and the post-regulatory period extends from 2012 to 2015.  The figures presented in bold identify statistically 
significant t and Z-test results. Significance levels are identified with the following notation *, ** and *** which indicate significance at the 















Table 4: The impact of CEO remuneration on shareholder dissent 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent Variable:  Dissent (%) OLS Quantile .10 Quantile .25 Quantile .50 Quantile .75 Quantile .90 













 (0.0044) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0023) (0.0050) (0.0175) 
Ln (CEO Tenure) -0.0005 -0.0003 0.0005 0.0010 0.0010 -0.0036 
 (0.0045) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0022) (0.0061) (0.0204) 
Industry-adjusted Mean TSR -0.0060
**





 (0.0028) (0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0014) (0.0020) (0.0059) 




 0.0011 -0.0004 -0.0127 
 (0.0020) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0009) (0.0032) (0.0078) 
Board Independence -0.0096 -0.0001 0.0005 0.0039 -0.0259 -0.0056 
 (0.0131) (0.0019) (0.0024) (0.0062) (0.0275) (0.0613) 
Ln(Total Directors) -0.0036 0.0024 0.0052
*
 0.0116 -0.0071 -0.0558 
 (0.0125) (0.0021) (0.0029) (0.0072) (0.0231) (0.0745) 
Non-Executive Percentage -0.0212 -0.0025 -0.0046 -0.0344
***
 -0.0388 0.0106 
 (0.0246) (0.0032) (0.0044) (0.0117) (0.0325) (0.0752) 
Ln (Director Busyness) -0.0069 -0.0024
*
 -0.0026 -0.0068 -0.0162 0.0480 
 (0.0083) (0.0013) (0.0017) (0.0041) (0.0157) (0.0397) 




 0.0395 0.0684 
 (0.0197) (0.0034) (0.0048) (0.0153) (0.0414) (0.0692) 









 (0.0309) (0.0037) (0.0052) (0.0086) (0.0312) (0.1290) 
       
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 





 -0.0330 0.0095 -0.0463 
 (0.0461) (0.0107) (0.0140) (0.0237) (0.0643) (0.1776) 





 for Quantiles 0.029 0.009 0.010 0.016 0.018 0.020 
This table presents mean and quantile regression results on shareholder dissent, expressed as a percentage. The sample of 2074 observations is from 2005 to 2015. Robust 
standard errors are provided in parentheses. Each regression also includes year and industry effects. Significance levels are identified with the following notation *, ** and *** 
which indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
59 
Table 5: The impact of the ‘Two Strikes’ rule on the relationship between shareholder dissent and total CEO pay 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent Variable: Dissent % OLS Quantile .10 Quantile .25 Quantile .50 Quantile .75 Quantile .90 











 (0.0054) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0026) (0.0074) (0.0157) 
Ln (CEO Tenure) -0.0128
**
 -0.0010 -0.0017 0.0009 -0.0128
*
 -0.0508 
 (0.0064) (0.0009) (0.0014) (0.0029) (0.0074) (0.0442) 
Industry-adjusted Mean TSR -0.0022 0.0003 0.0002 0.0019 0.0091
*
 -0.0063 
 (0.0046) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0033) (0.0047) (0.0114) 






 0.0050 -0.0012 
 (0.0023) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0012) (0.0033) (0.0101) 
Board Independence 0.0007 0.0022 0.0023 0.0075 -0.0211 0.0119 
 (0.0161) (0.0025) (0.0033) (0.0068) (0.0371) (0.0480) 
Ln (Total Directors) -0.0330
**
 -0.0014 -0.0006 -0.0004 -0.0456
*
 -0.0648 
 (0.0135) (0.0023) (0.0031) (0.0057) (0.0259) (0.0723) 
Non-Executive Percentage -0.0041 -0.0020 -0.0040 -0.0089 -0.0216 0.0302 
 (0.0261) (0.0036) (0.0051) (0.0117) (0.0399) (0.1064) 
Ln (Director Busyness) 0.0143
**
 0.0003 0.0017 0.0043 0.0159 0.0232 
 (0.0070) (0.0011) (0.0014) (0.0028) (0.0116) (0.0275) 



































 (0.0846) (0.0151) (0.0179) (0.0363) (0.1176) (0.3623) 
Post2012 * Ln (Total Remuneration) -0.0147
*
 0.0003 0.0014 0.0009 -0.0173 -0.0901
**
 
 (0.0086) (0.0016) (0.0021) (0.0043) (0.0120) (0.0401) 
Post2012 * Ln (CEO Tenure) 0.0215
**





 (0.0089) (0.0013) (0.0018) (0.0039) (0.0099) (0.0480) 
Post2012 * Industry-adjusted Mean TSR -0.0087 -0.0013 -0.0010 -0.0050 -0.0161
***
 -0.0126 
 (0.0058) (0.0022) (0.0029) (0.0037) (0.0049) (0.0113) 









 (0.0040) (0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0019) (0.0048) (0.0152) 
Post2012 * Board Independence -0.0190 -0.0033 -0.0041 -0.0091 -0.0177 0.0313 
 (0.0260) (0.0039) (0.0050) (0.0103) (0.0420) (0.1288) 
Post2012 * Ln (Total Directors) 0.0087
***





 (0.0032) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0014) (0.0050) (0.0161) 
Post2012 * Non-Executive Percentage -0.0409 -0.0036 -0.0091 -0.0431
*
 0.0236 -0.0525 
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 (0.0559) (0.0076) (0.0106) (0.0251) (0.1066) (0.1775) 
Post2012 * Ln (Director Busyness) -0.0035
***







 (0.0010) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0012) (0.0042) 
Post2012 * Rem Committee Inside/Outside Ratio -0.1070
*
 -0.0054 -0.0130 0.0112 -0.1864 -0.4435 
 (0.0631) (0.0124) (0.0139) (0.0311) (0.1200) (0.8801) 
Post2012 * Investor Concentration 0.0267 0.0030 -0.0023 -0.0019 -0.0110 0.0654 
 (0.0620) (0.0067) (0.0113) (0.0191) (0.0416) (0.2927) 
       
Industry Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effects No No No No No No 









 -0.0847 -0.2388 
 (0.0508) (0.0112) (0.0163) (0.0225) (0.0893) (0.2363) 





 for Quantiles 0.037 0.011 0.011 0.017 0.025 0.028 
 
This table presents mean and quantile regression results on shareholder dissent, expressed as a percentage. A post-regulation dummy (Post2012)  is included as an interaction term 
to account for the introduction of the ‘Two Strikes’ rule at the commencement of the 2012 financial year. The sample of 2074 observations is from 2005 to 2015. Robust standard 
errors are provided in parentheses. Each regression includes industry effects only, due to collinearity with the Post2012 dummy. Significance levels are identified with the following 



















Table 6: The impact of lagged shareholder dissent on total CEO pay 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent Variable:  Ln(Total Remuneration) OLS Quantile .10 Quantile .25 Quantile .50 Quantile .75 Quantile .90 
Dissentt−1 <= 8.22% 1.2670
**







 (0.5585) (0.8040) (0.6450) (0.6181) (0.6142) (0.9327) 
Dissentt−1 > 8.22% 0.2154 -0.0050 0.2990 0.1615 0.3548 0.3131 
 (0.1706) (0.2827) (0.2090) (0.1966) (0.3760) (0.2184) 













 (0.0222) (0.0500) (0.0256) (0.0239) (0.0255) (0.0288) 











 (0.0353) (0.1379) (0.0161) (0.0485) (0.0394) (0.0627) 



























 (0.0624) (0.1280) (0.0697) (0.0776) (0.0753) (0.1182) 





















 (0.1221) (0.2610) (0.1450) (0.1574) (0.1291) (0.1992) 













 (0.0435) (0.0788) (0.0530) (0.0489) (0.0475) (0.0724) 








 -0.2065 -0.0004 
 (0.1692) (0.3419) (0.1476) (0.1455) (0.1422) (0.2220) 
Investor Concentration -0.0901 -0.5602
*
 -0.4470 -0.0114 0.2839 0.1843
*
 
 (0.1884) (0.2899) (0.2732) (0.2405) (0.1838) (0.1009) 
       
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 














 (0.1731) (0.3525) (0.2168) (0.1874) (0.2759) (0.3493) 





 for Quantiles 0.650 0.631 0.645 0.644 0.633 0.605 
 
This table presents mean and quantile regression results on total CEO remuneration, expressed as a natural logarithm. Regressions include lagged values of shareholder dissent, 
expressed as a percentage. The sample of 2074 observations is from 2005 to 2015. Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses. Each regression also includes year and 
industry effects. Significance levels are identified with the following notation *, ** and *** which indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
62 
Table 7: The impact of the ‘Two Strikes’ rule on the relationship between total CEO pay and lagged shareholder dissent 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent Variable: Ln(Total Remuneration) OLS Quantile .10 Quantile .25 Quantile .50 Quantile .75 Quantile .90 







 (0.7562) (1.1342) (0.8496) (0.7193) (0.7610) (1.1222) 
Dissentt−1 > 8.22% 0.4225
*





 (0.2345) (0.2879) (0.2383) (0.2766) (0.3578) (0.3306) 
Post2012 0.1589 0.5495 0.0748 -0.2655 -0.1244 0.4011 
 (0.2657) (0.4685) (0.3038) (0.3445) (0.3348) (0.5085) 
Post2012 * Dissentt−1 <= 8.22% 0.4071 -2.0496 0.2622 0.2851 0.2047 0.0372 
 (1.0781) (1.6914) (1.4084) (1.1411) (1.3865) (1.6563) 
Post2012 * Dissentt−1 > 8.22% -0.6273
**
 0.1703 -0.5202 -0.5820 -1.1859 -0.9569
*
 
 (0.3040) (0.3908) (0.3554) (0.4035) (0.7827) (0.5296) 











 (0.0355) (0.0660) (0.0435) (0.0325) (0.0442) (0.0476) 











 (0.0341) (0.0811) (0.0253) (0.0553) (0.0407) (0.0658) 






















 0.0720 0.0411 
 (0.0873) (0.1579) (0.1044) (0.0866) (0.1154) (0.1753) 
Ln (Total Directors) -0.0139 -0.1384 0.0535 0.1222 0.1924 0.0961 












 (0.1544) (0.3493) (0.1979) (0.1511) (0.1535) (0.3138) 











 (0.0560) (0.0898) (0.0672) (0.0538) (0.0837) (0.1056) 






 -0.2179 -0.0445 
 (0.1839) (1.3314) (0.1557) (0.1508) (0.1842) (0.2187) 
Investor Concentration -0.2030 -0.5568 -0.4540 -0.2334 0.1614 0.1281 
 (0.2615) (0.4274) (0.3084) (0.3065) (0.3388) (0.1334) 
Post2012 * Ln (CEO Tenure) -0.0089 -0.1124 0.0161 0.0229 0.0663 0.0919 
 (0.0446) (0.0809) (0.0553) (0.0422) (0.0556) (0.0566) 
Post2012 * Industry-adjusted Mean TSR -0.0953
*
 -0.0759 -0.0110 -0.0599 -0.0305 -0.1301 
 (0.0523) (0.0815) (0.0352) (0.0590) (0.1641) (0.0797) 
Post2012 * Ln (Total Assets) -0.0218 -0.0126 -0.0128 0.0008 -0.0048 -0.0745
**
 
 (0.0174) (0.0262) (0.0169) (0.0227) (0.0247) (0.0320) 
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 (0.1200) (0.2106) (0.1663) (0.1214) (0.1448) (0.2086) 
Post2012 * Ln (Total Directors) 0.3263
**
 0.2609 0.1985 0.0280 0.2394 0.6019
**
 
 (0.1331) (0.1982) (0.1690) (0.1557) (0.1621) (0.2339) 
Post2012 * Non-Executive Percentage 0.1204 -0.3408 0.0853 0.7488
***
 0.0330 0.5231 
 (0.2526) (0.5118) (0.3451) (0.2859) (0.3256) (0.4596) 
Post2012 * Ln (Director Busyness) -0.1760
***







 (0.0590) (0.0948) (0.0694) (0.0576) (0.0856) (0.1074) 
Post2012 * Rem Committee Inside/Outside Ratio 0.2641 1.1995 0.1979 0.3562 -0.3219 0.2365 
 (0.3555) (1.4290) (0.4373) (0.3691) (0.3044) (0.9469) 
Post2012 * Investor Concentration 0.3249 0.1809 -0.1043 0.7293 0.3787 0.2897 
 (0.3606) (0.5484) (0.7124) (0.4496) (0.3903) (0.2353) 
       
Industry Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effects No No No No No No 














 (0.1891) (0.3962) (0.2698) (0.2305) (0.2609) (0.3061) 





 for Quantiles 0.651 0.629 0.645 0.646 0.634 0.614 
 
This table presents mean and quantile regression results on total CEO remuneration, expressed as a natural logarithm. Regressions include lagged values of shareholder dissent, 
expressed as a percentage. A post-regulation dummy (Post2012)  is included as an interaction term to account for the introduction of the ‘Two Strikes’ rule at the 
commencement of the 2012 financial year . The sample of 2074 observations is from 2005 to 2015. Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses. Each regression includes 
industry effects only, due to collinearity with the Post2012 dummy. Significance levels are identified with the following notation *, ** and *** which indicate significance at 








Table 8: The average treatment effect (ATT) of both first and second ‘strikes’ on total remuneration 
 Panel A: Pre-regulation - Single Strikes (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable:  Matching Type Treatment Control Difference t-statistic 
ΔLn(Total Remuneration)           
First Strike (t-1) Kernel -0.0401 0.0793 -0.1194 -1.7815* (0.067) 
First Strike (t-1) Radius -0.0401 0.0613 -0.1014 -1.4294 (0.0709) 
First Strike (t-1) 1-Nearest Neighbour -0.0419 0.0638 -0.1057 -1.1051 (0.0956) 
First Strike (t-1) 2-Nearest Neighbour -0.0401 0.0478 -0.088 -0.9492 (0.0927) 
First Strike (t-1) 3-Nearest Neighbour -0.0401 0.0379 -0.078 -0.8185 (0.0954) 
First Strike (t-1) 4-Nearest Neighbour -0.0401 0.0462 -0.0863 -0.9669 (0.0893) 
First Strike (t-1) 5-Nearest Neighbour -0.0401 0.0197 -0.0598 -0.6957 (0.086) 
 Panel B: Pre-regulation - Two Strikes (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable:  Matching Type Treatment Control Difference t-statistic 
ΔLn(Total Remuneration)           
Two Strikes (t-1) Kernel 0.039 0.0976 -0.0587 -0.403 (0.1456) 
Two Strikes (t-1) Radius 0.039 0.078 -0.0391 -0.2676 (0.146) 
Two Strikes (t-1) 1-Nearest Neighbour 0.039 -0.2741 0.313 1.2902 (0.2426) 
Two Strikes (t-1) 2-Nearest Neighbour 0.039 -0.1496 0.1886 0.7428 (0.2539) 
Two Strikes (t-1) 3-Nearest Neighbour 0.039 -0.1204 0.1593 0.6925 (0.2300) 
Two Strikes (t-1) 4-Nearest Neighbour 0.039 -0.0627 0.1017 0.5069 (0.2005) 
Two Strikes (t-1) 5-Nearest Neighbour 0.039 -0.0293 0.0683 0.3717 (0.1837) 
 Panel C: Post-regulation - Single Strikes (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable:  Matching Type Treatment Control Difference t-statistic 
ΔLn(Total Remuneration)           
First Strike (t-1) Kernel -0.1939 0.0302 -0.2242 -2.4194** (0.0927) 
First Strike (t-1) Radius -0.201 0.0326 -0.2336 -2.4237** (0.0964) 
First Strike (t-1) 1-Nearest Neighbour -0.201 -0.0199 -0.181 -1.5376 (0.1177) 
First Strike (t-1) 2-Nearest Neighbour -0.201 -0.0208 -0.1801 -1.4213 (0.1267) 
First Strike (t-1) 3-Nearest Neighbour -0.201 -0.0087 -0.1923 -1.7130* (0.1122) 
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First Strike (t-1) 4-Nearest Neighbour -0.201 -0.0039 -0.197 -1.8088* (0.1089) 
First Strike (t-1) 5-Nearest Neighbour -0.201 0.0225 -0.2235 -2.2590** (0.0989) 
 Panel D: Post-regulation - Two Strikes (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable:  Matching Type Treatment Control Difference t-statistic 
ΔLn(Total Remuneration)           
Two Strikes (t-1) Kernel -0.0881 0.014 -0.1021 -0.4176 (0.2444) 
Two Strikes (t-1) Radius -0.0881 0.0718 -0.1599 -0.3822 (0.4184) 
Two Strikes (t-1) 1-Nearest Neighbour -0.0881 -0.1225 0.0345 0.0707 (0.4876) 
Two Strikes (t-1) 2-Nearest Neighbour -0.0881 0.2952 -0.3833 -0.7219 (0.531) 
Two Strikes (t-1) 3-Nearest Neighbour -0.0881 0.1918 -0.2799 -0.583 (0.48) 
Two Strikes (t-1) 4-Nearest Neighbour -0.0881 0.1293 -0.2173 -0.4814 (0.4514) 
Two Strikes (t-1) 5-Nearest Neighbour -0.0881 0.0716 -0.1597 -0.3704 (0.4312) 
 
This table presents propensity score matching results employing several different matching algorithms on the relationship between first and second ‘strikes’ 
in previous financial years on ΔLn(Total Remuneration). All independent variables employed in the main quantile regression models were used to establish 
propensity score matches, with the exception of the Director Busyness variable. The Director Busyness variable was excluded as a matching criterion as it 
did not satisfy the balancing property in both panels. Common support and a caliper of 0.01 is imposed for each matching algorithm. As propensity scores 
were estimated, standard errors are calculated using bootstrapping with 1000 replications. Panel A and B measure the effect of shareholder dissent above 
25%, a measure which is equivalent to an actual ‘strike. Second ‘strike’ firms were identified in the pre-regulation period as having two consecutive 
instances of shareholder dissent above 25%. Panel C and D isolate the ATT effect for firms actually receiving first and second ‘strikes’ under the ‘Two 
strikes’ regime. Bootstrapped standard errors are provided in parentheses. Significance levels are identified with the following notation *, ** and *** which 







Table 9: Market reaction to the implementation of the ‘Two Strikes’ rule 
Event Grouping Variable 
Date of 
Event 
Event Window Negative % CAAR t-statistic 
1 PC Report Released 
4 January 
2010 
[-1, 1] 41.18% 10.18% 1.9211* 
1 PC Report Released [-2, 2] 28.57% 11.81% 2.5694** 
1 PC Report Released [-5, 5] 37.82% 10.73% 2.1547** 
1 PC Report Released [-10, 10] 51.26% 8.21% 1.097 




[-1, 1] 45.83% -0.46% 1.4636 
2 Public Consultation [-2, 2] 49.17% -0.66% 0.8572 
2 Public Consultation [-5, 5] 45.00% 0.56% 2.2947** 
2 Public Consultation [-10, 10] 46.67% 3.46% 1.4923 
3 Bill Registered 
29 June 
2011 
[-1, 1] 39.17% 1.21% 3.1545*** 
3 Bill Registered [-2, 2] 51.67% 0.08% 0.6638 
3 Bill Registered [-5, 5] 40.83% 1.01% 2.313** 
3 Bill Registered [-10, 10] 47.50% -1.72% 0.7788 
4 Legislation Effective 
1 July 
2011 
[-1, 1] 25.83% 2.47% 6.3091*** 
4 Legislation Effective [-2, 2] 35.00% 2.31% 4.6286*** 
4 Legislation Effective [-5, 5] 36.67% 1.63% 3.4812*** 
4 Legislation Effective [-10, 10] 48.33% -0.80% 0.8546 
 
Table 11 presents cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) around events leading up to and including the 
introduction of the Two Strikes rule. Significance levels from two-tailed t-tests are identified with the following notation 
*, ** and *** which indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The non-parametric generalised 
rank test (GRANKT) is employed as the test statistic to account for the cross-correlation and the serial correlation of 
returns and volatility induced by event clustering (Kolari and Pynnönen 2011). Event one is the date the Productivity 
Commission publically released their report on the regulation of director and executive remuneration in Australia. Event 
two is the date that draft revisions to the Corporations Act 2011 (Cth) (Austl.) were released for public consultation. 













Table 10: Market reaction to instances of first and second strikes on remuneration reports 
  Panel A: Pre-regulation 
  Strikes N Event Window CAAR Negative % t-statistic 
  
First Strike 97 
[-1, 1] 11.46% 47.42% 1.0906 
  [-2, 2] 14.47% 48.45% 1.3097* 
  [-5, 5] 12.84% 48.45% 1.1661 
  [-10, 10] 12.02% 54.64% 1.0773 
  
Second Strike 20 
[-1, 1] 2.99% 45.00% 1.6616* 
  [-2, 2] 2.17% 45.00% 0.9754 
  [-5, 5] 0.98% 50.00% 0.4483 
  [-10, 10] 2.22% 45.00% 0.7364 
  Panel B: Post-regulation 
  
Strikes N Event Window CAAR Negative % t-statistic 
  
First Strike 52 
[-1, 1] -1.38% 60.38% -1.3445* 
  [-2, 2] -2.76% 62.26% -2.2045** 
  [-5, 5] -1.57% 57.69% -2.0102** 
  [-10, 10] -4.14% 55.77% -1.8445** 
  
Second Strike 9 
[-1, 1] -0.31% 55.56% -0.2041 
  [-2, 2] 1.31% 44.44% 0.6272 
  [-5, 5] -1.97% 66.67% -0.9494 
  [-10, 10] -6.02% 66.67% -1.3686 
  
  
Table 10 presents cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) around first and second strike instances. First 
and second ‘strikes’ in the pre-regulation period represent instances where shareholder dissent was greater than 
25%. Significance levels for one-tailed cross-sectional t-statistics are identified with the following notation *, 




















             
 
